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Article 2

Questioning Law Enforcement
THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND
COUNTERTERRORISM INTERVIEWS
Shirin Sinnar†
INTRODUCTION
Law enforcement interviews are sometimes viewed as
one of the least intrusive and least objectionable investigative
techniques in the government’s counterterrorism arsenal.1 In
theory, a law enforcement agent’s voluntary request for
information from an individual for a counterterrorism
investigation, or a border agent’s questioning of a person
returning to the United States after traveling abroad, only
minimally impinges on privacy and individual rights. Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and Customs and Border
Protection (CBP) interviews do not involve extreme
interrogation methods, the imposition of criminal sanctions for
speech, or the use of covert investigative tools hidden from
public view—all policies that have attracted considerable
public and scholarly attention.
Yet law enforcement interviews of U.S. Muslims in the
terrorism context2 involve greater coercion and stigma than
†

Law Fellow, Stanford Law School. J.D., Stanford Law School, 2003. I owe
deep gratitude to Norman Spaulding, Matthew Stephenson, Ahilan Arulanantham,
David Cole, Jayashri Srikantiah, Scott Michelman, Sudha Setty, George Bisharat,
Jeanne Merino, Andrea Roth, Briana Rosenbaum, Elizabeth Pollman, and Deepa
Varadarajan for comments on earlier drafts. My research assistant Jimmy Bierman,
and the law librarians at Stanford Law School, especially George Wilson and Sergio
Stone, provided excellent research assistance. Finally, I am indebted to Imran
Maskatia, Maryam Maskatia, Abbas and Zehra Sinnar, and Shirin and Arif Maskatia
for invaluable support.
1
See infra note 16.
2
Throughout this piece, I focus on law enforcement interviews in the U.S.
Muslim community, given the particular focus of U.S. counterterrorism efforts on
Islamic extremist violence. Where I discuss a study, policy, or legal case that focuses on
an ethnic community that substantially overlaps with U.S. Muslims (such as “Arab
Americans” or “South Asians”), I make the distinction clear. Otherwise, I use the term
U.S. Muslims with the understanding that much of the analysis would also apply to
overlapping ethnic communities. In addition, in referring to “counterterrorism”
interviews or interviews in the “terrorism context,” I refer not just to interviews within
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prevailing accounts recognize. Interviews are startlingly
common: some estimates suggest that the FBI, for instance,
has questioned hundreds of thousands of U.S. Muslims.3 FBI
and CBP interviews alike have elicited widespread concern
among U.S. Muslims as a result of the coercion involved, the
content of the questioning, and the basis for interviewee
selection. As personal, direct encounters between individuals in
the U.S. Muslim community and the U.S. government,
interviews are especially likely to inform targeted individuals’
and communities’ sense of “belonging” and inclusion as ethnic
and religious minorities in the United States.
Where law enforcement agents select individuals for
questioning primarily on the basis of their speech, associations,
or other expressive activities protected by the First
Amendment, interviews raise special concern. For instance,
according to recent congressional testimony from a Muslim
civil rights organization, the FBI questioned a computer
programmer after he posted “political articles from mainstream
news sources on his Facebook page”—approaching him at his
workplace in front of colleagues and supervisors and
potentially jeopardizing his job.4 The FBI contacted another
man for questioning after a local newspaper published his
nonviolent comments about the political situation in Pakistan.5
Tabbaa v. Chertoff was a rare case of such targeting to
actually reach the courts. In Tabbaa, the CBP questioned,
fingerprinted, photographed, and searched dozens of individuals
returning to the United States after attending an Islamic
conference in Toronto, applying the extra screening procedures
“normally reserved for suspected terrorists.”6 The government
had no individualized suspicion regarding any of the plaintiffs,
all U.S. citizens, but carried out these procedures on those
travelers who told border officials that they had attended the
Toronto gathering.7 The conference drew over thirteen thousand
participants and featured prominent Islamic speakers, musical

an explicit terrorism investigation, but to interviews conducted for, or justified by, the
general purpose of gathering information on potential terrorist threats.
3
See infra note 20 and accompanying text.
4
Racial Profiling and the Use of Suspect Classifications in Law Enforcement
Policy: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution, Civil Rights, and Civil
Liberties of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 67 (2010) (statement of
Farhana Khera, President and Executive Director, Muslim Advocates).
5
Id.
6
Tabbaa v. Chertoff, 509 F.3d 89, 92 (2d Cir. 2007).
7
Id. at 92, 94.
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performances, spiritual reflection, and communal prayer.8
Border agents questioned plaintiffs about their activities at the
conference, the content of the lectures, and the reasons they
attended, and the detentions lasted between four and six hours.9
The CBP defended itself in Tabbaa by asserting that it
acted based on information that individuals associated with
terrorist activities would attend the conference and that the event
might serve as a “meeting point” to plan terrorist activities or
“exchange ideas and documents.”10 The agency had ordered border
agents to ascertain the identities of conference participants, check
their status on watch lists, and search luggage to find any
evidence of terrorist plans, documents, or weapons.11 The Second
Circuit Court of Appeals held that the measures significantly
burdened plaintiffs’ freedom of association but ruled that the
government’s security interests justified the intrusion.12
Tabbaa was wrongly decided: the court failed to
question the notion that it was rational—and fair—to stop
every person returning from a diverse gathering of thirteen
thousand people on the possibility that she may have met a
terrorist, and perfunctorily dismissed alternative methods of
investigation.13 But it appropriately recognized the stigmatic
harm from the screening measures and applied heightened
scrutiny to the practice—engaging in a form of review other
courts have declined to apply in First Amendment challenges
to law enforcement investigations and surveillance.14
This article argues for heightened scrutiny of law
enforcement interviews triggered by protected speech and
association, which impose a substantial burden on those rights.
Not all interviews based on First Amendment expression are
wrong; speech or association may at times be a relevant basis for
law enforcement inquiry. But the harms from such interviews
call for careful scrutiny to determine whether a sufficient nexus
exists between the First Amendment trigger for the scrutiny and
an actual threat. Interviews based on First Amendment
expression send a message to affected individuals and
communities that their expressions of identity and participation
in the public sphere are devalued, imposing stigma and chilling
8
9
10
11
12
13
14

Id. at 94.
Id. at 94, 98, 100.
Id. at 93.
Id. at 94.
Id. at 102-03.
Id. at 104.
Id. at 102.
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expression. And there are historical reasons to question law
enforcement interviews focused on First Amendment activities:
in an earlier period of heightened fear over domestic and foreign
threats, the FBI deliberately used interviews to suppress
political speech and association by creating the impression that
“there is an FBI agent behind every mailbox.”15
There is now a growing literature on the effects of
terrorism investigations on expression and association,16 yet the
scholarship on First Amendment freedom of speech and
association doctrine related to investigations remains scant.
Several scholars briefly cite doctrinal obstacles to Free Speech
Clause challenges to surveillance or investigations before
turning their attention elsewhere.17 Moreover, the literature on
law enforcement interviews in the terrorism context is almost
nonexistent.18 Interviews are rarely the subject of new
legislation, public announcements, or court challenges that
attract public and scholarly notice. Even scholars arguing for
greater protection of civil liberties often mention interviews only

15

See Socialist Workers Party v. Att’y Gen., 642 F. Supp. 1357, 1389
(S.D.N.Y. 1986) (quoting internal FBI memo from 1970).
16
For examples of post-9/11 scholarship on the First Amendment implications
of counterterrorism investigations, see Linda E. Fisher, Guilt by Expressive Association:
Political Profiling, Surveillance and the Privacy of Groups, 46 ARIZ. L. REV. 621 (2004);
David A. Harris, Law Enforcement and Intelligence Gathering in Muslim and Immigrant
Communities After 9/11, 34 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 123 (2010); Aziz Z. Huq, The
Signaling Function of Religious Speech in Domestic Counterterrorism, 89 TEX. L. REV. 833
(2011); Tom Lininger, Sects, Lies, and Videotape: The Surveillance and Infiltration of
Religious Groups, 89 IOWA L. REV. 1201 (2004); Scott Michelman, Who Can Sue over
Government Surveillance?, 57 UCLA L. REV. 71 (2009); Lawrence Rosenthal, First
Amendment Investigations and the Inescapable Pragmatism of the Common Law of Free
Speech, 86 IND. L.J. 1 (2011); Dawinder S. Sidhu, The Chilling Effect of Government
Surveillance Programs on the Use of the Internet by Muslim-Americans, 7 U. MD. L.J.
RACE, RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS 375 (2007); Daniel J. Solove, The First Amendment as
Criminal Procedure, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 112 (2007); Patrick P. Garlinger, Note, Privacy,
Free Speech, and the Patriot Act: First and Fourth Amendment Limits on National
Security Letters, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1105 (2009); Gayle Horn, Note, Online Searches and
Offline Challenges: The Chilling Effect, Anonymity and the New FBI Guidelines, 60
N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 735 (2005); Murad Hussain, Note, Defending the Faithful:
Speaking the Language of Group Harm in Free Exercise Challenges to Counterterrorism
Profiling, 117 YALE L.J. 920 (2008).
17
See, e.g., Harris, supra note 16, at 153-54; Lininger, supra note 16, at 1266;
Hussain, supra note 16, at 946-48.
18
The primary law review article found focusing on FBI or CBP interviews,
though not from a First Amendment perspective, is Tracey Maclin, “Voluntary”
Interviews and Airport Searches of Middle Eastern Men: The Fourth Amendment in a
Time of Terror, 73 MISS. L.J. 471 (2003); see also Hussain, supra note 16, at 927-32
(addressing Tabbaa in presenting a free exercise theory for claims against targeting of
religious expression).
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to contrast them with more intrusive methods, thereby casting
interviews as a relatively harmless investigative practice.19
This article addresses these gaps in the literature. Part
I contextualizes FBI and CBP interviews of U.S. Muslims and
describes three concerns they raise: the coercion of FBI and
CBP encounters, the content of questioning, and the
discriminatory basis for selection of interviewees. This part
further argues that neither Fourth Amendment law nor
internal regulations provides meaningful restrictions on
interviews. Part II contends that law enforcement interviews
that involve First Amendment profiling—the selection of an
individual for law enforcement attention because of political,
religious, or cultural expression or association—impose
particularly grave stigmatic costs and chilling effects on
individuals and communities. This part also maps out two
separate normative concerns that the practice raises: a
suppression concern about deliberate government attempts to
suppress speech through an investigation and an overbreadth
concern about the scope of an investigation triggered by
expression, even where there is not an apparent illegitimate
purpose. I argue that even without a suppression purpose, an
investigation based on First Amendment profiling raises
concern both because of the greater risk that hostility to
expression influenced the scope of the investigation and
because of the serious harms to individuals and communities.
Part III argues that courts ought to apply heightened
scrutiny to interviews based on First Amendment profiling, and
that existing First Amendment doctrine on free speech and
association, while inconclusive, offers the potential for courts to do
so. Some plaintiffs challenging FBI and CBP interviews should be
able to surmount standing barriers that courts have erected in
First Amendment cases, and further demonstrate, on the merits,
substantial harm from investigations. Furthermore, lower courts
have split as to whether heightened scrutiny is appropriate for
reviewing First Amendment challenges to law enforcement
investigations, and I counter the objection that narrow-tailoring
requirements would impede critical law enforcement interests.
Plaintiffs are most likely to succeed in challenges to First
Amendment profiling where they can demonstrate tangible harm,
19

See Solove, supra note 16, at 175-76 (advocating a warrant requirement for
government information-gathering implicating First Amendment values, but not in
voluntary interviews); Fisher, supra note 16, at 673 (contrasting voluntary interviews
with infiltration of organizations).
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such as detention, reputational injuries, or economic costs, in
addition to stigma and chilling effects.
A few words about the limited nature of my claims are
in order. I do not contend that the “average” interview based on
First Amendment profiling will trigger judicial scrutiny or
establish a violation of the law. It is also beyond question that
any challenge to law enforcement terrorism investigations will
need to overcome judicial concerns about second-guessing the
factual determinations of law enforcement agencies regarding
the appropriateness of particular investigative measures. Yet
in the terrorism context, any legal challenge to an investigative
practice will face significant obstacles. But precisely because
legal challenges in this area are difficult, any avenue for
judicial review not foreclosed becomes significant. While I do
not argue that plaintiffs will usually prevail in challenging
First Amendment profiling, I do contend that ostensibly
nonintrusive and unobjectionable law enforcement questioning
can impose substantial harm on individuals and communities,
and that the First Amendment’s guarantees of free speech and
association offer the potential to contest these harms in an
important segment of cases.
I.

LAW ENFORCEMENT INTERVIEWS

Law enforcement agents question individuals for
national-security purposes in a wide variety of contexts:
immigration officials interview noncitizens applying for
citizenship or permanent residency, local police question
motorists stopped in traffic whose names trigger a watch-list
match, prosecutors question witnesses before grand juries, and
investigators interrogate suspects arrested for terrorism
offenses. This article focuses on two of the most common forms
of interviews in the counterterrorism context affecting
immigrants and U.S. citizens alike—FBI interviews of
individuals approached at home, work, or in their communities,
and CBP interviews of individuals seeking to reenter the
United States at airports or land borders after traveling
abroad. The prevailing view in much of the legal doctrine and
commentary, sometimes explicit but often unstated, is that
interviews in either context inflict little harm, at least relative
to other investigative methods, because they are minimally
intrusive, overt, and involve “mere questioning.” This part
argues that while FBI and CBP interviews serve an important
national-security function, in practice, these interviews raise
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serious concerns related to their coercion, the content of
questioning, and the basis for selection of interviewees, and
that existing Fourth Amendment doctrine and internal agency
guidelines provide insufficient constraints.
A.

FBI and CBP Interviews: Context and Concerns

Some scholars and officials have estimated that the FBI
has conducted as many as two hundred thousand or half a
million interviews of Muslims in the United States20—
staggering numbers, if accurate, given estimates that adult
Muslims in the United States number fewer than two million.21
In the first three years following the September 11 attacks, the
FBI carried out at least four well-publicized national rounds of
interviews of Muslims and Arabs. These rounds included two
interview campaigns of thousands of Arab male noncitizens
based on demographic information suggesting “similarit[ies]”
with al Qaeda terrorists;22 interviews of nearly ten thousand
Iraqi immigrants, including U.S. citizens, before the invasion of
Iraq;23 and interviews of Muslims in the months before the 2004
presidential election.24 But beyond these announced interview
campaigns, the FBI continues to interview U.S. Muslims, in
waves and individually, in order to investigate specific terrorist
threats,25 gather general intelligence about communities,26
20

LOUISE A. CAINKAR, HOMELAND INSECURITY: THE ARAB AMERICAN AND
MUSLIM EXPERIENCE AFTER 9/11 113, 125 (2009) (citing statements in 2005 by a retired
FBI counterterrorism official and the director of the MIT Center for International
Studies). It is not clear what data these estimates relied on, and the FBI official’s
reference to “half a million interviews” may have been intended as a rhetorical
statement of the large number of interviews rather than an actual estimate.
21
A recent national study by the Pew Research Center estimated that there
are 1.4 million adult Muslims in the United States, although estimates of the
community’s size vary considerably. PEW RESEARCH CTR., MUSLIM AMERICANS: MIDDLE
CLASS AND MOSTLY MAINSTREAM 9-10 (2007).
22
U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-03-459, HOMELAND SECURITY:
JUSTICE DEPARTMENT’S PROJECT TO INTERVIEW ALIENS AFTER SEPTEMBER 11, 2001, at
7-8 (2003) [hereinafter GAO, PROJECT TO INTERVIEW ALIENS].
23
See, e.g., Tom Brune, Defending Iraqi Interviews, NEWSDAY (N.Y.), Apr. 18,
2003, at A28; Frank James, FBI Questions Rankle Some U.S. Iraqis, CHI. TRIB., Apr.
13, 2003, at C14.
24
See, e.g., Brian Haynes, Extra Scrutiny Chafes Muslims, LAS VEGAS REV.J., Oct. 4, 2004, at 1A; Richard B. Schmitt & Donna Horowitz, FBI Starts to Question
Muslims in U.S. About Possible Attacks, L.A. TIMES, July 18, 2004, at A17; Dennis
Wagner, FBI’s Queries of Muslims Spurs Anxiety, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Oct. 11, 2004, at 1B.
25
See, e.g., Jake Armstrong, FBI in Lodi: Abusive or Just Assertive?, LODI
NEWS-SENTINEL, July 23, 2005 (describing questioning and surveillance of Muslims in
Lodi, California after arrest of several residents on terrorism and/or immigration
charges); Nathaniel Hoffman, Muslims Endure FBI Persistence in Lodi, CONTRA COSTA
TIMES, June 11, 2005, at A01 (same).
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follow up on tips of suspicious activity called in from the
public,27 or solicit people to act as undercover informants.28
At U.S. international airports and land borders, the
CBP questions returning travelers, including U.S. citizens, to
intercept terrorists, weapons, and physical contraband29 as well
as to collect intelligence for law enforcement agencies’ broader
use.30 Reports of actual interviews make clear that the
intelligence collected is not limited to activities with a specific
nexus to the border (such as a person’s legal status in the
United States or suspicious international travels), but includes
information gathering on U.S. mosques and organizations
within the United States.31 Thus, the agency uses its authority
to search and question travelers at U.S. borders to acquire a
range of information that law enforcement could not easily
compel within the United States.
All travelers at U.S. borders can expect some scrutiny at
the point of entry, including a review of identification and travel
documents, and sometimes immigration-status questioning or
luggage inspection.32 For most U.S. citizens, these encounters are
brief, but the CBP pulls aside some individuals—including
citizens—for protracted questioning or more intrusive searches.

26

See, e.g., Carrie Johnson & Robin Shulman, Probes Test Trust that
Authorities Strove to Win from U.S. Muslims, WASH. POST, Oct. 5, 2009, at A03
(quoting retired FBI special agent describing agents’ role as to “know everything that’s
going on” in a mosque or community); see also Alex Ransom, Muslims Feel Targeted by
FBI, MERCURY (Dall.), Apr. 11, 2010, at 1.
27
See, e.g., Eric Bailey, FBI Questions High School Student over “PLO”
Doodle, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 16, 2005, at B4 (describing questioning of 16-year-old based
on allegation that student had doodled the initials “PLO” on a binder and stored
pictures of suicide bombers on his cell phone).
28
See, e.g., Peter Waldman, A Muslim’s Choice: Turn U.S. Informant or Risk
Losing Visa, WALL ST. J., July 11, 2006, at A1.
29
U.S. Customs & Border Prot., Protecting Our Borders—This Is CBP,
CBP.GOV (June 7, 2010), www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/about/mission/cbp.xml.
30
U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROT., CBP DIRECTIVE NO. 3340-049, BORDER
SEARCH OF ELECTRONIC DEVICES CONTAINING INFORMATION 7 (2009), available at
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/cbp_directive_3340-049.pdf (describing sharing of
terrorism information with other federal agencies); see also ANALYSIS OF EXCERPTS FROM
ASIAN LAW CAUCUS—ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION 2008 FOIA RELEASE 4 (2008),
available at http://www.eff.org/files/filenode/alc/bordersearch_analysis.pdf (describing
email from CBP New York field office stating that CBP’s data collection capabilities had
attracted wide interest from other law enforcement agencies); Ellen Nakashima, Expanded
Powers to Search Travelers at Border Detailed, WASH. POST, Sept. 23, 2008, at A02
(describing FBI interview of individual based on information obtained from CBP search).
31
See infra notes 65-75 and accompanying text.
32
U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROT., KNOW BEFORE YOU GO: REGULATIONS FOR
INTERNATIONAL TRAVEL BY U.S. RESIDENTS 3, 5 (2009), available at http://www.cbp.gov/
linkhandler/cgov/travel/vacation/kbyg/kbyg_regulations.ctt/kbyg_regulations.pdf
[hereinafter KNOW BEFORE YOU GO].
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These selections may occur either at “random”33 or as a result of
factors like travel to particular countries,34 presence on a watch
list,35 or undisclosed “risk factors” flagged by an automated
program.36 These selection decisions do not require
individualized suspicion.37
Both FBI and CBP interviews serve indisputably
important purposes. Following the September 11 attacks, the
FBI shifted its focus from traditional law enforcement to
intelligence gathering to detect and interrupt potential
threats.38 With tens of thousands of threats and suspicious
activities identified each year,39 interviews allow the FBI to
gather information directly from individuals believed to have
some information about a possible threat. In many cases, as the
agency has argued, interviews allow the FBI to quickly rule out
individuals who do not pose a real threat—preventing further
scrutiny of innocent people and focusing scarce investigative
resources on actual concerns.40
The same need for efficient screening applies at the
border. The CBP states that nearly 1.2 million travelers attempt
to cross into the United States each day, and the agency
intercepts about five hundred people a year out of terrorism or
national-security concerns.41 According to the agency, border
screening interviews have enabled it to prevent actual terrorists
33

U.S. Customs & Border Prot., If You Experience Problems with Your
Arrival in the U.S., CBP.GOV (Apr. 30, 2010), http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/newsroom/
fact_sheets/travel/usarrivals_problems.xml.
34
SHIRIN SINNAR ET AL., ASIAN LAW CAUCUS, RETURNING HOME: HOW U.S.
GOVERNMENT PRACTICES UNDERMINE CIVIL RIGHTS AT OUR NATION’S DOORSTEP 31-32
(2009), available at http://www.asianlawcaucus.org/alc/publications/us-border-reportreturning-home/ [hereinafter ASIAN LAW CAUCUS].
35
Id. at 33-35.
36
Id. at 28-29; see also U.S. Customs & Border Prot., supra note 29.
37
See, e.g., Tabbaa v. Chertoff, 509 F.3d 89, 92 (2d Cir. 1997).
38
See DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE ATTORNEY GENERAL GUIDELINES FOR DOMESTIC
FBI OPERATIONS 5-6, 9, 17 (2008) [hereinafter MUKASEY GUIDELINES]; Scott Shane &
Lowell Bergman, FBI Struggling to Reinvent Itself to Fight Terror, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 10,
2006, at A1.
39
See AUDIT DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR
GENERAL, AUDIT REPORT 09-02, THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION’S TERRORIST
THREAT AND SUSPICIOUS INCIDENT TRACKING SYSTEM ii (2008) (reporting 108,000
threats and suspicious incidents recorded in FBI database between July 2004 and
November 2007).
40
“Are You Part of a Revolution Trying to Overthrow the Government of the
United States?,” PITTSBURGH CITY PAPER, Jan. 15, 2003, at 22 (quoting FBI
explanation that interviewing donors to Muslim charities suspected of links to
terrorists allows law enforcement to rule out those who innocently gave donations).
41
U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROT., CBP: SECURING AMERICA’S BORDERS 1 (2006),
available
at
http://www.cbp.gov/linkhandler/cgov/newsroom/publications/mission/cbp_
securing_borders.ctt/cbp_securing_borders.pdf [hereinafter SECURING AMERICA’S BORDERS].
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from entering; for example, based on suspicions raised in an
interview, it denied entry to a Jordanian national who later
killed 132 people in a suicide bombing abroad.42
Despite the clear necessity for FBI and CBP interviews,
the way in which these interviews are conducted raises three
concerns. One concern relates to the coercion and intimidation
interviewees face. Although FBI interviews are nominally
voluntary, the tactics the FBI used in some interviews reported
by the press or community organizations virtually compelled
compliance.43 According to these accounts, FBI agents often
approached people at work, where they could not refuse to
cooperate without eliciting suspicion and fear of reprisal from
employers already wary of Muslims; some individuals
reportedly lost their jobs after workplace visits.44 FBI agents
reportedly pressured some individuals to submit to questioning
immediately, despite their stated desire to obtain a lawyer
first.45 At other times, agents knocked on people’s doors late in
the evening or at night, which heightened the interviewees’
perception of intimidation.46 In some cases, FBI agents
misrepresented the purpose of an interview: agents told a
person that they were investigating potential hate crimes
against Muslims or conducting general community outreach
while asking questions that focused on who the person knew
and whether the interviewee presented a threat.47 And agents
42

Id. at 4.
To be sure, this was not true as a universal matter: FBI agents sometimes
told interviewees that the questioning was voluntary. See, e.g., James, supra note 23.
In addition, some individuals declined interview requests. See, e.g., Armstrong, supra
note 25 (reporting that several Muslims refused to appear for interviews). But the only
quantitative evidence of individuals declining interview requests, from the
government’s initial post-9/11 interview program, suggests the numbers are miniscule.
See Memorandum on Final Report on Interview Project from Kenneth L. Wainstein,
Dir., Exec. Office for U.S. Att’ys, Dep’t of Justice, to the Att’y Gen. (Feb. 15, 2002)
[hereinafter Final Report on Interview Project] (reporting that only 1 in 69 individuals
in Oregon, 1 in 59 in Minnesota, and 8 of 313 in Eastern Michigan declined).
44
See, e.g., Barbara Carmen, FBI Agents Stir Old Fears Among IraqiAmericans, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Apr. 4, 2003, at 01C (quoting Ohio Muslim leader
stating that some people lost their jobs after FBI workplace visits); Tim Townsend, FBI
Interviews Prompt Muslim Rights Project, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Apr. 1, 2010, at
A1 (noting workplace interviews); ACLU Sues, Says FBI Spying on Muslims, CHI.
TRIB., Dec. 3, 2004, at 10 (same); CAINKAR, supra note 20, at 170 (same).
45
Josh Richman, ACLU Sues Over Muslim Interviews, ALAMEDA TIMES-STAR,
Oct. 23, 2004.
46
See, e.g., ACLU Sues, Says FBI Spying on Muslims, supra note 44; “Are
You Part of a Revolution,” supra note 40.
47
“Are You Part of a Revolution,” supra note 40; COUNCIL ON AM.-ISLAMIC
RELATIONS, GREATER L.A. AREA CHAPTER, THE FBI’S USE OF INFORMANTS,
RECRUITMENT AND INTIMIDATION WITHIN MUSLIM COMMUNITIES 6 (2009) [hereinafter
CAIR CALIFORNIA] (on file with author).
43
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reportedly told others that if they refused to submit to an
interview, the agents would arrest them.48
In an indeterminate number of cases, the FBI engaged
in even more overt intimidation to compel people to agree to
ostensibly voluntary interviews. For instance, after the arrests
of a Lodi, California, father and son on terrorism charges,49 the
FBI aggressively sought information from other Pakistani
Muslims: agents stationed their cars in front of homes, followed
people for days, circled a mosque hosting a “know your rights”
presentation where individuals they sought to interview had
gathered, called individuals as many as ten times a day, and
warned people that they would be “bad mouthed” at work if
they did not cooperate.50 These measures conveyed a broader
impression that the FBI would ratchet up pressure on those
who declined an interview request.
At U.S. borders, by contrast, the compulsion is explicit:
individuals cannot enter (or return to) the United States
without satisfying border agents’ demands. Although U.S.
citizens have an absolute right to enter the country,51 legally
preventing the CBP from denying entry altogether to citizens
who decline to answer questions,52 the CBP sometimes prolongs
the detention of individuals who refuse to answer questions or
subjects them to more intense searches as a result.53 Agents
have not only used their power to delay admission to enforce

48

Carmen, supra note 44; CAIR CALIFORNIA, supra note 47, at 6.
Linda Goldston & Lisa Fernandez, FBI Expanding Terror Probe Tied to
Lodi Father, Son, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, June 10, 2005, at A1. The government
initially suggested that others in Lodi, beyond those detained, might be linked to al
Qaeda, but no other arrests followed. Many observers questioned the initial charges,
including a retired FBI agent who sought to testify in defense of the accused. Shane &
Bergman, supra note 38, at A1; Mark Arax, The Agent Who Might Have Saved Hamid
Hayat, L.A. TIMES, May 28, 2006, at I16; John Simerman & Jessica Guynn, Arrests
Illuminate Terror Probe, CONTRA COSTA TIMES, June 9, 2005, at A01.
50
Armstrong, supra note 25; Hoffman, supra note 25, at A01; Letter from ACLU
of N. Cal. & Lawyers’ Comm. for Civil Rights of the S.F. Bay Area to FBI and Other
Agencies Requesting Information Under Freedom of Information Act 2-3 (June 16, 2005),
available at https://www.aclu.org/FilesPDFs/aclu%20-%20nc%20foia%20request%20for%
20lodi.pdf (describing complaints of Muslim community members related to Lodi terrorism
investigation).
51
See Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 67 (2001) (indicating that U.S. citizenship
confers an “absolute right to enter [the nation’s] borders”).
52
In several cases, the U.S. government is alleged to have prevented U.S.
citizens on the “no-fly list” from boarding flights returning to the United States,
sometimes for extended periods, though it eventually permitted them to return. See Peter
Finn, Detained Va. Teen Set to Return to U.S., WASH. POST, Jan. 21, 2011, at B01.
53
See ASIAN LAW CAUCUS, supra note 34, at 12 & n.4.
49
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cooperation with questioning54 but have also, at times, engaged
in more overt intimidation.
For instance, Zakariya Reed—a U.S. citizen, Muslim
convert, and National Guard veteran—experienced several
intimidating encounters at the U.S.-Canada border.55 Reed
perceived one occasion as deliberately intimidating: a border
agent asked Reed about a letter to the editor that Reed wrote,
which was critical of U.S. support for Israel and the war in Iraq;
in the same interview, another agent conspicuously removed and
reloaded the clip of his gun in front of Reed.56 On a separate
occasion, five CBP agents stopped and surrounded Reed’s car,
frisked him, and held him for several hours; during the
interview, a CBP agent asked Reed why he had adopted a
Muslim name and converted to Islam.57 Other interviews of U.S.
Muslims have involved handcuffing or displays of physical force58
or statements that at “the border, . . . you have no rights.”59
Protracted questioning at the border has often taken
place in conjunction with detailed searches of travelers’
electronic media and reading materials. CBP officers conducted
detailed searches of Muslims’ laptop computers, cell phones,
and other electronic media,60 asking the travelers to identify
family members appearing in pictures stored on a digital
camera,61 questioning them about websites they visited,62 or
examining websites individuals flagged as “favorites.”63 Border
agents perused travelers’ books, lecture notes, and personal

54

See, e.g., Tabbaa v. Chertoff, 509 F.3d 89, 99-100 (2d Cir. 2007) (stating
that U.S. citizens were threatened with continued detention unless they cooperated
with CBP inspections); MUSLIM ADVOCATES, UNREASONABLE INTRUSIONS:
INVESTIGATING THE POLITICS, FAITH, & FINANCES OF AMERICANS RETURNING HOME 2122 (2009) [hereinafter MUSLIM ADVOCATES] (reporting that CBP told U.S. citizen
reluctant to answer questions that the detention would end sooner if he complied).
55
Matthew Rothschild, Muslim American Grilled at Border over Religion,
PROGRESSIVE (May 9, 2007), http://www.progressive.org/mag_mc050907.
56
Id.
57
Id.; MUSLIM ADVOCATES, supra note 54, at 28.
58
See, e.g., MUSLIM ADVOCATES, supra note 54, at 22, 28, 29; ASIAN LAW
CAUCUS, supra note 34, at 36; Press Release, Council on Am.-Islamic Relations, DHS to
Probe CAIR-MI Complaints on Border Questioning of Muslims (May 4, 2011), available at
http://www.cairmichigan.org/news/press_releases/cair_mi_welcomes_dhs_civil_rights_inv
estigation_/.
59
ASIAN LAW CAUCUS, supra note 34, at 11.
60
Janet I. Tu, Privacy vs. Border Security: Critics Say Laptop Searches Cross
the Line, SEATTLE TIMES, July 23, 2008, at A1.
61
ASIAN LAW CAUCUS, supra note 34, at 16.
62
Id. at 19.
63
Id. at 34.
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papers, and sometimes photocopied the documents or asked
questions about the travelers’ views on the material.64
Beyond the coercion involved in FBI and CBP interviews,
a second concern relates to the content of the questions asked.
FBI and CBP officers questioned numerous Muslims, including
U.S. citizens, about their religious and political beliefs and
activities—subjects that U.S. citizens do not ordinarily expect
government officers to probe. For example, CBP agents spent
three hours questioning one Ph.D. student returning to the
United States from a U.S. government-sponsored trip to Yemen
on his local mosques, how long he had been Muslim, and the
Islamic organizations in which he participated; when the
student questioned the relevance of the religious inquiries, the
agents told him that the detention “would end sooner if he
simply answered the questions.”65 CBP agents asked other
returning U.S. citizens about their views on foreign policies and
politics,66 the mosques they attended,67 their charitable
activities,68 membership in religious organizations,69 attendance
at
community
events,70
participation
in
political
71
demonstrations, support for lawful organizations,72 the religious
sect to which they belonged,73 and prayer habits.74 Similar
questions were asked in FBI interviews.75
Such questioning, even without coercion or intimidation,
can convey powerful messages about the government’s respect
for communities, neutrality towards religions, and overall
64

See, e.g., id. at 16-18, 21; Ellen Nakashima, Expanded Powers to Search
Travelers at Border Detailed, WASH. POST, Sept. 23, 2008, at A02; Ellen Nakashima,
Collecting of Details on Travelers Documented, WASH. POST, Sept. 22, 2007, at A01.
65
MUSLIM ADVOCATES, supra note 54, at 21-22.
66
Id. at 33, 40; ASIAN LAW CAUCUS, supra note 34, at 34; Jack Chang, Men Say
Customs Bureau Asked About Faith, Politics, CONTRA COSTA TIMES, May 29, 2003, at A01.
67
MUSLIM ADVOCATES, supra note 54, at 20, 36, 38.
68
Id. at 20.
69
Id. at 22.
70
Id. at 30.
71
Id. at 39.
72
Id. at 30.
73
Matthai Chakko Kuruvila, Muslims Resent Customs Queries: Group Collects
Complaints on Faith Questions, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, May 29, 2003, at 1B.
74
MUSLIM ADVOCATES, supra note 54, at 34.
75
See Pedro Ruz Gutierrez & Henry Pierson Curtis, FBI Plans Interviews with
Arab Americans, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Oct. 8, 2004, at A1; Wayne Parry, Muslims Offered
Free Legal Help for Voluntary FBI Interviews, PHILA. INQUIRER, Aug. 12, 2004, at B05;
Richard B. Schmitt & Donna Horowitz, FBI Starts to Question Muslims in U.S. About
Possible Attacks, L.A. TIMES, July 18, 2004, at A17; NICOLE J. HENDERSON ET AL., VERA
INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, LAW ENFORCEMENT & ARAB AMERICAN COMMUNITY RELATIONS
AFTER SEPTEMBER 11, 2001: TECHNICAL REPORT 84 (2006) [hereinafter VERA INSTITUTE
STUDY]; “Are You Part of a Revolution,” supra note 40; James, supra note 23.
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fairness. Unlike covert investigative methods such as electronic
surveillance, an interview is a highly personal encounter between
an individual and a law enforcement officer who embodies the full
force of the law—the power to arrest and imprison, to detain and
deport, or to exclude altogether from the country. In that
encounter, even a relatively low-level officer represents the
authority of the United States. Thus, the exchange that occurs in
an interview signals the U.S. government’s beliefs as to what, or
whom, it considers threatening.
When an FBI agent asks an Iraqi-American, selected
without individualized suspicion, whether he practices Islam—
following questions on knowledge of terrorism or weapons of
mass destruction—it sends the message that the government
considers the practice of Islam itself to be a threat.76 Similarly,
when a CBP agent asks a U.S. resident at the border his views
on the war in Iraq,77 it signals that the government considers
one’s position on U.S. foreign policy relevant to his belonging in
the United States. As a uniquely expressive investigative
method, interviews carry a particular risk of conveying
messages, intended or not.
A third concern relates to the basis for interviewee
selection—specifically, the concern that either ethnic or
religious profiling, or First Amendment activities, led to that
selection. While some FBI and CBP interviews are occasioned
by specific threat information or the inclusion of a person on a
watch list,78 ethnic criteria or First Amendment activities
supply the explicit basis for other interviews. For instance, the
FBI openly relied on national origin in interviewing thousands
of U.S. Arabs in the months after the September 11 attacks79
and in the period preceding the invasion of Iraq; the latter
interview campaign included U.S. citizens.80 At other times, an
ethnic basis for interview selection was unannounced but
strongly indicated by the demographics of those interviewed.81
76

See James, supra note 23.
MUSLIM ADVOCATES, supra note 54, at 41.
78
In fact, inclusion in the Customs and Border Protection watch list raises
separate concerns related to the inadequate review process for watch list additions and
the insufficient mechanisms for redress. See ASIAN LAW CAUCUS, supra note 34, at 33-40.
79
The government selected interviewees because of demographic and visa
similarities to al Qaeda terrorists. See GAO, PROJECT TO INTERVIEW ALIENS, supra note
22, at 7-8.
80
See, e.g., Brune, supra note 23; James, supra note 20.
81
See, e.g., Phillip O’Connor, Tactics with Somali Cabdrivers Stir Criticism of
FBI, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Feb. 3, 2011, at A1 (describing interviews of twentyfive to fifty Somali cabdrivers after the arrest of one for material support to terrorism).
77
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On other occasions still, the FBI’s focus on particular groups
resulted from its response to suspicious activity reports called
in by the public, even where the reports clearly suggested
ethnic or religious biases.82
The CBP has also based targeting decisions explicitly on
national origin, even for U.S. citizens. For instance, past CBP
intelligence directives have called for particular scrutiny of
naturalized U.S. citizens of Pakistani origin.83 In addition, CBP
officers told some travelers that despite their U.S. citizenship,
they were targeted because of where they were born;84 officers
told others that even if they acquired U.S. citizenship, they
would “always be a foreigner.”85
Finally, for both FBI and CBP interviews, individuals’
First Amendment activities sometimes triggered the selection
decision. Part II of this article elaborates on interviews based on
First Amendment profiling, the harm such interviews present,
and the line separating justifiable from unwarranted scrutiny.
Ultimately, the coercion, content, and selection criteria
of interviews affect not just the rights and liberties of the
Muslim community, but also potentially the very interest in
security that is the professed goal of the interviews themselves.
A growing body of literature suggests that for U.S. Muslims, as
with other communities, perceptions of the fairness of law
enforcement practices affect community members’ trust in, and
willingness to assist, law enforcement.86 For instance, a recent
study of New York Muslims by Tom Tyler, Stephen Schulhofer,
and Aziz Huq found that perceptions of “procedural justice”
involving U.S. counterterrorism policies—but not self-described
religiosity, cultural differences, or political background—
strongly correlate with individuals’ willingness to cooperate

82

See, e.g., OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE
SEPTEMBER 11 DETAINEES: A REVIEW OF THE TREATMENT OF ALIENS HELD ON
IMMIGRATION CHARGES IN CONNECTION WITH THE INVESTIGATION OF THE SEPTEMBER 11
ATTACKS 15-16 (2003) (reporting post-9/11 detentions of individuals based on
“anonymous tips called in by members of the public suspicious of Arab and Muslim
neighbors who kept odd schedules”).
83
ASIAN LAW CAUCUS, supra note 34, at 29-31 (noting 2004 intelligence
directive that called for greater scrutiny of naturalized citizens of Pakistani origin); see
also Anne E. Kornblut & Spencer S. Hsu, U.S. Changing Way Air Travelers Screened,
WASH. POST, Apr. 2, 2010, at A06.
84
ASIAN LAW CAUCUS, supra note 34, at 25 (reporting interview in which
CBP pulled aside a U.S. citizen because she was born in Pakistan).
85
Id. at 24.
86
See, e.g., Harris, supra note 16, at 132-41; VERA INSTITUTE STUDY, supra
note 75, at 87, 94-95.
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with antiterrorism policing.87 As a visible and overt practice
affecting U.S. Muslims, FBI and CBP interviews perceived as
unfair may impose broader systemic costs in addition to
burdening individual rights.
B.

Interviews and Fourth Amendment Fictions

The natural place to begin an examination of the
constitutionality of interviews might be the Fourth
Amendment—the usual standard for measuring the lawfulness
of law enforcement detentions. Two legal fictions, however,
presumptively exclude interviews from Fourth Amendment
protection. First, because individuals are not required to
submit to an FBI interview, courts deem these interviews
“voluntary.” Second, because border officials may question any
traveler who seeks to enter the United States, courts consider
CBP interviews “routine.”
As Tracey Maclin has argued in reference to the Justice
Department’s initial post-9/11 interview campaign, most FBI
interviews would not constitute seizures under the Supreme
Court’s interpretation of the Fourth Amendment, despite the
fact that those approached would have difficulty refusing the
interview request.88 The Supreme Court has indicated that
police questioning generally falls outside the scope of Fourth
Amendment scrutiny because individuals in such encounters
are free to terminate the questioning.89 Under current legal
norms, only in the extraordinary case where police engage in
“patently abusive and intimidating behavior” would a court
find that an interview constitutes a seizure.90 According to
Maclin, empirical evidence suggests that most people would not
feel free to terminate ostensibly consensual police encounters
because the average person interprets even a law enforcement
officer’s polite request for cooperation as a legal command.91
Nonetheless, the constitutional standard for “voluntary”

87

Tom Tyler et al., Legitimacy and Deterrence Effects in Counterterrorism
Policing: A Study of Muslim Americans, 44 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 365, 368-69 (2010).
88
Maclin, supra note 18, at 493-502.
89
Id. at 494; see also DAVID COLE, NO EQUAL JUSTICE: RACE AND CLASS IN
THE AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 16-20 (1999) (describing Supreme Court’s
“reasonable person fiction” that an ordinary person would be able to reject police
questioning).
90
Maclin, supra note 18, at 500-01.
91
Id. at 507.
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questioning “was never intended to measure the reality of
police-citizen encounters.”92
In the CBP context, the separate fiction that
questioning is “routine” scuttles ordinary Fourth Amendment
protections. The Supreme Court has long proclaimed the
government’s “paramount” authority to police the entry of
people and objects across its borders93 and has declared that
border searches are reasonable simply because they occur at
the border.94 Thus, the Court has determined that the Fourth
Amendment imposes no requirement of individualized
suspicion for brief questioning on one’s immigration status at
border checkpoints95 or for “routine” searches and seizures.96
Applying this restrictive Fourth Amendment doctrine,
two federal courts deemed the border detentions of Muslim
U.S. citizens returning from abroad routine, despite the fact
that the detentions were substantially longer, more intrusive,
and more stigmatizing than ordinary CBP inspections of
returning U.S. citizens. Thus, in Tabbaa v. Chertoff, the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals declared that the questioning, patdown searches, fingerprinting, photographing, and four- to sixhour detentions of Muslim U.S. citizens returning from
Canada—without individualized suspicion—were “routine”
even though CBP used screening measures “normally reserved
for suspected terrorists.”97 The district court in Rahman v.
Chertoff, a case involving U.S. citizens screened at the border
because of mistaken association with a terrorist watch list,
dismissed most of the challenged detentions as “routine” border
stops, even where the stops included detentions of as long as
six hours, handcuffing, or brief displays of physical force.98
Thus, Fourth Amendment doctrine presumptively
permits FBI and CBP interviews, even those that would not
strike the average person as truly “voluntary” or “routine.”

92
93
94
95
96
97
98

31, 2010).

Id.
United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149, 152-53 (2004).
Id.
United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 563 (1976).
United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 538 (1985).
509 F.3d 89, 92, 95, 98-99 (2d Cir. 2007).
Rahman v. Chertoff, No. 05C3761, 2010 WL 1335434, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Mar.
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Weak Internal Constraints on Interviews

Despite the documented historical use of interviews to
suppress political activities, and current concerns over the
practice, FBI and CBP internal guidelines impose few
constraints on these interviews. In particular, existing
guidelines do not limit the circumstances in which investigators
can ask questions related to political and religious activities and
do not provide effective constraints against selecting people for
scrutiny on account of their First Amendment activities.
1. FBI Interviews
Guidelines for FBI investigations have grown
progressively less stringent over time and now give FBI officers
considerable discretion. The attorney general first issued
internal guidelines for FBI domestic security investigations in
1976 in response to public outcry over abuses.99 The first
guidelines required a factual predicate for all investigations
and additional procedural requirements for interviews,
including, in most cases, a requirement for supervisory
approval.100 But successive versions of the attorney general’s
guidelines loosened such constraints, culminating in the
newest and weakest version issued by Attorney General
Michael Mukasey in late 2008.101
The Mukasey Guidelines include the most expansive
definition yet of what FBI agents may legitimately investigate,
permitting agents to conduct a form of investigation called
“assessments” without any information or even allegation of a
potential national-security threat.102 The Mukasey Guidelines
99

See generally Allison Jones, Note, The 2008 FBI Guidelines: Contradiction
of Original Purpose, 19 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 137 (2009).
100
OFFICE OF THE ATT’Y GEN., DOMESTIC SECURITY INVESTIGATION
GUIDELINES, reprinted in FBI Statutory Charter: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 96th Cong. 20-22 (1978). Under these 1976 “Levi” Guidelines, agents could
use interviews in preliminary investigations (the least intrusive tier of investigation)
only to gather certain public information or to identify the subject of an investigation;
in limited investigations, the next tier, agents could use interviews for other purposes,
but only with supervisory approval and after “full consideration of such factors as the
seriousness of the allegation, the need for the interview, and the consequences of using
the technique.” Id. at 20-21.
101
See MUKASEY GUIDELINES, supra note 38; see also Jones, supra note 99, at
139-50.
102
MUKASEY GUIDELINES, supra note 38, at 17, 21; FED. BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION, DOMESTIC INVESTIGATIONS AND OPERATIONS GUIDE 39 (2008),
available at http://documents.nytimes.com/the-new-operations-manual-from-the-f-b-i
[hereinafter OPERATIONS GUIDE].
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authorize interviews in assessments as well as other methods “of
relatively low intrusiveness,”103 and generally do not require
supervisory approval for interviews.104 The Domestic
Investigations and Operations Guide implementing the Mukasey
Guidelines permits pretextual interviews, in which an agent fails
to reveal an FBI affiliation or the true purpose of the information
request.105 The Mukasey Guidelines do not permit information
collection for the purpose of monitoring First Amendment–
protected activity,106 and the Operations Guide states that
assessments may not be based “solely” on the exercise of First
Amendment rights.107 That standard, however, appears to permit
an assessment conducted mostly based on First Amendment
activity but also based on some additional, facially innocent
fact—say, an agent’s decision to interview those who recently
converted to Islam and serve in the U.S. armed forces.108
Beyond the use of interviews for assessments and
investigations, the Mukasey Guidelines appear to give the FBI
broad authorization to conduct interviews for intelligence
planning that goes beyond the investigation of specific cases.109
They seem to allow interviews that “develop overviews and
analyses” of “present, emergent, and potential threats and
vulnerabilities” and “their contexts and causes”110—a standard
that could conceivably justify interviews initiated to inquire
into the religious or political “contexts and causes” of extremist
threats. Notably, while guidelines for the original post-9/11
interviews of Arab noncitizens forbade inquiries into religious

103

MUKASEY GUIDELINES, supra note 38, at 17-18, 20.
Id. at 18; OPERATIONS GUIDE, supra note 102, at 63-64.
105
OPERATIONS GUIDE, supra note 102, at 64, 68. The FBI plans to release a
new version of the Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide that would grant
still greater investigative powers to law enforcement agents. See Charlie Savage, F.B.I.
Agents Get Leeway to Push Privacy Bounds, N.Y. TIMES (June 12, 2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/13/us/13fbi.html.
106
MUKASEY GUIDELINES, supra note 38, at 13. For more detailed FBI
interpretation of First Amendment restrictions on its activities, see OPERATIONS
GUIDE, supra note 102, at 24-30.
107
OPERATIONS GUIDE, supra note 102, at 44.
108
Moreover, the Guide makes clear that its definition of “First Amendment
activities” does not extend to all activities that would be protected by the First
Amendment, such as the advocacy of violence. Id.
109
See MUKASEY GUIDELINES, supra note 38, at 29 (permitting FBI to “draw
on all lawful sources of information” in intelligence analysis).
110
Id.
104
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beliefs or practices,111 the Mukasey Guidelines and Operations
Guide do not.112
The Mukasey Guidelines and Operations Guide include
some restrictions to prevent coercing interviewees, although the
press accounts described above suggest that the FBI does not
consistently follow them. The Operations Guide states that
information in interviews “must be voluntarily provided” and
that agents should not “state or imply in any way” that “adverse
consequences may follow if the interviewee does not provide the
information.”113 In addition, the Mukasey Guidelines state that
agents should stop questioning “immediately” if a person
indicates a desire to consult a lawyer.114 Despite these
limitations, the Operations Guide does not prohibit FBI agents
from disregarding ambiguous or hesitant expressions of desire
for legal counsel, even though individuals approached by the
FBI may be too intimidated to state that desire definitively. Nor
does the Guide disallow pressure tactics short of implying
adverse consequences, such as insinuating that a reluctant
interviewee “must have something to hide.”
The Mukasey Guidelines also advise that where
different investigative methods are each “operationally sound
and effective,” agents should use the “least intrusive method
feasible,”115 but the Mukasey Guidelines contain other language
to minimize the constraint this principle suggests. The
Operations Guide recognizes that interviews with “employers,
neighbors, and associates,” or those conducted at the
workplace, are more intrusive than interviews in discrete
locations.116 Despite this helpful distinction, the Operations
Guide also advises that agents should primarily measure the
degree of intrusion based on how much procedural protection
established law and the Mukasey Guidelines themselves
provide for the investigative method117—thus designating
interviews as a whole as a relatively nonintrusive choice. In
addition, the Mukasey Guidelines give significant discretion to
111

GAO, PROJECT TO INTERVIEW ALIENS, supra note 22, at 9.
Although the publicly released version of the Operations Guide is redacted,
one does not expect that the government would redact a restriction that protects
individual rights.
113
OPERATIONS GUIDE, supra note 102, at 63.
114
Id.
115
MUKASEY GUIDELINES, supra note 38, at 12-13; see also Exec. Order No.
12,333, § 2.4, 46 Fed. Reg. 59,941 (Dec. 4, 1981), reprinted as amended in 50 U.S.C.
§ 401 (2006) (containing similar restriction on intelligence collection).
116
OPERATIONS GUIDE, supra note 102, at 36.
117
Id. at 35.
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agents in interpreting these rules, advising agents not to
hesitate to use any lawful method, especially in terrorism
investigations.118
2. CBP Interviews
Documents released by the CBP suggest a lack of
significant constraints on questioning, but the agency has not
publicly released sufficient information on its border inspection
policies to fully judge the level of constraint that agents have in
choosing whom to interview, for how long, or in what manner. A
CBP training manual states that “routine questioning” at the
border does not require reasonable suspicion.119 An immigration
inspection manual released by the department, possibly outdated,
states that “reasonable suspicion” is generally required to detain
U.S. citizens for “extensive questioning,” but it appears to vitiate
that requirement in the next breath by permitting agents to
“continue inspecting for Customs purposes.”120
The CBP appears to have no written policy restricting
the questioning of individuals about religious views, political
activities, or other expression protected by the First
Amendment.121 In fact, one high-level CBP official told
community organizations that it was appropriate to question
an individual about the mosque the individual attends.122 The
agency does issue internal directives that may reflect First
Amendment considerations; for instance, one CBP field office
advised border agents not to apply special enforcement
measures based “solely” on a person’s return “from a
118

MUKASEY GUIDELINES, supra note 38, at 12-13.
U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROT., INSPECTOR’S FIELD MANUAL ch. 18.6, at
166 (Charles M. Miller ed., 2006), available at http://www.ilw.com/immigrationdaily/
News/2008,0513-cbp.pdf [hereinafter INSPECTOR’S FIELD MANUAL]; U.S. CUSTOMS &
BORDER PROT., CBP OFFICER BASIC TRAINING C2900—LAW COURSE STUDENT OUTLINE
10 (2006), available at http://www.eff.org/fn/directory/5283/312 (FOIA documents
released to Asian Law Caucus and Electronic Frontier Foundation, June 26, 2008,
Bates Stamp 112).
120
INSPECTOR’S FIELD MANUAL, supra note 119, at 18. The policy requires
probable cause for detentions beyond an unspecified “reasonable period of time.” Id.
These provisions, which appear in a 2006 edition released through a Freedom of
Information Act request, may be outdated: the section on questioning U.S. citizens
refers both to immigration inspectors as well as to “Customs,” while the CBP
consolidated the functions of the U.S. Customs Service and Immigration and
Naturalization Service in 2003. See KNOW BEFORE YOU GO, supra note 32, at 3. The
Inspector’s Field Manual itself notes that the material is “gradually being updated” to
reflect CBP policies. See INSPECTOR’S FIELD MANUAL, supra note 119, at 1.
121
ASIAN LAW CAUCUS, supra note 34, at 13-14.
122
Id. at 14-15.
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pilgrimage to Mecca,” while also advising that “the large influx
of travelers during this time period may be used as a cover by
extremists and/or terrorists to enter the United States.”123
Thus, existing evidence of internal agency regulations
suggests insignificant constraints on the factual basis for
initiating interviews in either the FBI or CBP context, and few
meaningful constraints on interviews that bear on individuals’
political or religious expression. Neither the Fourth Amendment
nor internal regulations offers real protection against the actual
intrusion and stigma of FBI and CBP encounters.
II.

FIRST AMENDMENT PROFILING

In the last part, this article argued that the coercion,
content, and selection criteria behind law enforcement
interviews present serious concerns that have largely been
unaddressed. This article turns now to one set of interviews that
raises particular concern: where individuals’ lawful acts of
expression or association trigger a knock on the door or
detention at the border, it sends a particularly strong message of
exclusion to individuals and their communities and creates a
chilling effect on expression. This part defines First Amendment
profiling and discusses the profound stigmatic costs and chilling
effects of the practice. This article then argues that while First
Amendment profiling is sometimes justifiable, it is inappropriate
both where the government deliberately seeks to suppress
speech and where law enforcement investigations—even those
with a legitimate purpose—sweep too broadly and consequently
burden lawful speech and association.
When the FBI or CBP agent questions a person because
he wrote a letter to the editor criticizing U.S. intervention in
Afghanistan, worshipped at a particular mosque, or visited a
religious website, they engage in what I call First Amendment
profiling: the selection of a person for law enforcement
attention because she has engaged in acts of expression or
association of a political, religious, or cultural nature that
would be protected by the First Amendment. CBP’s
investigation of individuals returning to the United States
123

Memorandum from U.S. Customs & Border Prot. Port of Buffalo, Muslims
Performing Hajj (Pilgrims to Mecca) (Dec. 12, 2007), available at
https://www.eff.org/files/filenode/alc/073008_cbp_bordersearch01.pdf (FOIA document
released in redacted form to Asian Law Caucus and Electronic Frontier Foundation,
July 30, 2008, Bates Stamp 191).
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after attending an Islamic religious conference in Canada,
litigated in the Second Circuit in Tabbaa v. Chertoff,124 provides
a paradigmatic example of such profiling.
Murad Hussain described the detentions in Tabbaa as
“cultural profiling,” which he defined as government targeting of
“expressions of cultural identity” as proxies for “criminality,
terrorist connections, or other subversive propensities,” noting
that expressions of identity are often “significantly correlated”
with membership in a racial, ethnic, or religious group.125 Others
have called investigations based on First Amendment conduct
“political profiling”126 or “First Amendment investigations.”127
Building on these conceptions, I consider First Amendment
profiling to include investigative decisions triggered by
expression or association of a cultural, religious, or political
nature, whether “pure” speech or expressive conduct, that would
be protected under the First Amendment.
Given that the First Amendment protects such a wide
range of expression, with no consensus on the amendment’s
core meaning, scholars have recognized the difficulty in
delimiting the scope of expression that raises First Amendment
concerns in the investigative context. Eugene Volokh argues
that a broad interpretation of the First Amendment might lead
one to the untenable conclusion that because speaking or
sending an e-mail are constitutionally protected actions, we
should interpret the First Amendment as limiting government
“subpoenas demanding that people testify about what someone
said or wrote.”128 My definition focuses on expression or
association of a religious, cultural, or political nature, not as a
normative statement of the outer limits of First Amendment
protection, but because expression or association outside these
areas frequently raises concerns of a different kind, and
arguably degree. A person who triggers FBI scrutiny by
sending an e-mail about purchasing a vast quantity of fertilizer
may have engaged in a communicative act protected by the
First Amendment (sending an e-mail), but the act holds no
particular political, cultural, or religious meaning. A law
enforcement investigation into that speech act does not
124

509 F.3d 89 (2d Cir. 2007). See supra notes 6-11 and accompanying text.
Hussain, supra note 16, at 925-26.
126
Fisher, supra note 16, at 625 (citing Chip Berlet & Abby Scher, Political
Profiling: Police Spy on Peaceful Activities, AMNESTY NOW 20 (Spring 2003)).
127
See generally Rosenthal, supra note 16.
128
Eugene Volokh, Deterring Speech: When Is It “McCarthyism”? When Is It
Proper?, 93 CALIF. L. REV. 1413, 1444 (2005); see also Solove, supra note 16, at 153.
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stigmatize particular views or manifestations of identity in the
same way as investigations triggered by the political, cultural,
or religious aspect of a communication.
While I limit my definition of First Amendment
profiling to expression and association of a political, cultural, or
religious nature, I expand it in two other respects. First, I
consider First Amendment profiling to include not just an
initial decision to target a person for investigation, but also any
subsequent decision to prolong an investigation on account of
First Amendment expression. For example, First Amendment
profiling would include a law enforcement agent’s decision to
broaden an investigation because of a person’s responses to
questions about religious affiliations. It would not include,
however, incidental questioning on religious or political beliefs,
even if independently objectionable, where it does not trigger
the interview or intensify law enforcement scrutiny.129
Second, I include within First Amendment profiling
investigative decisions based “predominantly”—not just
“solely”—on protected expression. For instance, it would
include not just border agents’ decisions, as in Tabbaa, to
question people solely because they attended an Islamic
conference, but also a decision to question people because they
had attended the conference and returned at night, or because
they had attended the conference and were young men. The
concerns raised by First Amendment profiling, as described in
the next section, are not diminished in such cases.
A.

The Impact of First Amendment Profiling
1. Stigmatic Harms

The most immediate, and perhaps most pervasive, harm
of First Amendment profiling in law enforcement
investigations, including interviews, is the imposition of
stigma.130 U.S. Muslims have described interviews triggered by
129

Inquiries on religion and politics, even without First Amendment profiling,
might give rise to an independent challenge based on the Supreme Court’s compelled
disclosure cases, especially in compulsory border interviews. For some discussion of
these cases, see infra notes 194-207 and accompanying text.
130
A large volume of literature, since the publication of Erving Goffman’s
seminal account, has attempted to define and conceptualize stigma. ERVING GOFFMAN,
STIGMA: NOTES ON THE MANAGEMENT OF SPOILED IDENTITY (1963). I use the term
“stigma” in both the sense defined by Goffman (an “attribute that is deeply
discrediting” that reduces the individual “from a whole and usual person to a tainted,
discounted one”) and according to Bruce Link and Jo Phelan’s more recent
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their religious or political activities as branding them, and
their communities, as disloyal or suspicious—as outsiders
excluded from “belonging” to the nation.
“We weren’t treated as American citizens. We were
treated as suspects,” recounted one Muslim college student
whom CBP detained for attending the conference referenced in
Tabbaa and then ordered to “stand face-first against the wall,”
his legs apart, to be searched for weapons.131 Such encounters
affect not just the individuals questioned, but their broader
ethnic or religious community’s sense of belonging in the
United States. An Oregon Muslim community leader
questioned by CBP agents about why he made a religious
pilgrimage to Mecca said that Muslims had grown accustomed
to being “pariahs in their own country.”132
The harms associated with First Amendment profiling
mirror those arising from explicit racial or religious profiling.133
Where a form of expression is strongly linked to one’s ethnicity,
national origin, or religion, government selection of individuals for
special scrutiny on account of their expression will “feel” the same
as targeting members of that racial or religious group directly.
Certainly the Muslim Americans detained in Tabbaa did not
perceive their detentions to be less stigmatizing because the
trigger was membership at an Islamic conference—not their
religion per se—or because CBP might theoretically have stopped
any non-Muslims who said they had attended the conference. As
the correlation between an expressive practice and membership
in a particular racial or religious group approaches 100 percent,
the technical distinction between the two collapses altogether: the
questioning of seven Muslim men for praying in a convenience

conceptualization of stigma as the co-occurrence of components including: the labeling
of a particular human difference, the linkage of that difference with stereotypes, the
use of that difference to separate “us” from “them,” and the resulting loss of status and
discrimination in a context of unequal power. See id. at 3; Bruce G. Link & Jo. C.
Phelan, Conceptualizing Stigma, 27 ANN. REV. SOC. 363, 367 (2001).
131
Jay Tokasz, Local Muslims Troubled by Treatment at Border: About 40
Detained After Toronto Trip, BUFFALO NEWS, Jan. 31, 2005, at B1.
132
Noelle Crombie, FBI Outreach to Muslims Comes Amid Interviews,
OREGONIAN, July 22, 2004, at C01.
133
One might question why an Equal Protection or Free Exercise Clause
challenge is not available to challenge these measures. See Hussain, supra note 16, at
944-52 (arguing that where the government selects people for scrutiny based not on
their membership in a protected group, but based on behavior that largely correlates
with it, the requirement that plaintiffs prove discriminatory intent will impede
challenges under both the Equal Protection Clause and under prevailing Free Exercise
Clause interpretations).
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store parking lot illustrates an instance that is at once religious
and First Amendment profiling.134
At the border, questioning and extensive searches of
returning U.S. citizens particularly convey a message of
exclusion since CBP agents effectively control the terms by
which a person can return home. A Sacramento Muslim and
naturalized citizen recounted that his experiences at the
border—including repeated screenings, questioning on his
political views, and searches of websites he visited—made him
feel “unwelcome” in his own country.135 He said, “I never
experienced such a feeling at any international airport in the
world, including Third World countries. But I have this feeling
when I come home.”136
Furthermore, First Amendment profiling sends a
message to the nation as a whole, not just affected
communities, that Muslims are unequal. As Murad Hussain
has argued, law enforcement scrutiny of Muslim Americans’
expressive activities labels Muslims “presumptively disloyal
and unworthy of empathy” to the polity at large, facilitating
hate crimes and private discrimination and stymieing the
community’s efforts to use civic engagement to achieve social
equality.137 Indeed, a growing social science and legal literature
points to the tangible costs of stigma for individuals and
communities.138 Not only do stigmatized groups lose self-respect
and tend to internalize “at least part of the version of their
identities imposed by the stigma,” but society correspondingly
“acts toward the stigmatized person on the basis of the stigma,”
leading to a deprivation of material goods from economic
opportunities to political representation.139 While stigma is
134

See Ken Ritter, Muslim Group Says FBI Still on Nevada Prayer Case,
KOLOTV.COM (June 21, 2010), http://www.kolotv.com/southernnevadanews/headlines/
96852029.html. When one man questioned why their prayers had elicited suspicion,
the police officer replied, “I don’t know if you’re . . . saying, ‘I hope that I kill a police
officer today.’ . . . We just want to make sure that you guys are good people.” CAIRtv,
Video: CAIR Concerned About FBI Questioning of “Henderson 7,” YOUTUBE (June 23,
2010), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lxGNN3U6Dac&feature=player_embedded.
135
ASIAN LAW CAUCUS, supra note 34, at 34.
136
Id.; see also Kuruvila, supra note 73 (quoting U.S. citizen describing his
experience of CBP questioning as “trying to instill in us a feeling that we don’t belong here”).
137
Hussain, supra note 16, at 938-41.
138
See R.A. Lenhardt, Understanding the Mark: Race, Stigma, and Equality in
Context, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 803, 836-47 (2004); Link & Phelan, supra note 130, at 370-74.
139
KENNETH L. KARST, BELONGING TO AMERICA: EQUAL CITIZENSHIP AND THE
CONSTITUTION 26-27 (1989). For recent studies suggesting links between stigma and
the physical health of U.S. Arab communities, see Diane S. Lauderdale, Birth
Outcomes for Arabic-Named Women in California Before and After September 11, 43
DEMOGRAPHY 185 (2006); Aasim I. Padela & Michele Heisler, The Association of
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often seen as a result of equal protection violations, it results
no less from First Amendment profiling.
2. Chilling Effects on Expression
Perhaps the most common harm legal scholars posit as
resulting from law enforcement investigations into political and
religious expression is the chilling impact on such expression.140
Despite the fact that scholars sometimes favorably contrast
interviews to clandestine surveillance,141 the overt nature of
interviews actually makes them more likely to directly and
immediately influence behavior than covert investigative
methods.
On some occasions, the chilling effect may be deliberate.
Law enforcement agencies deliberately used interviews in the
past to suppress lawful political activities by sowing mistrust
within movements. The extensive congressional investigation of
U.S. intelligence operations in the mid-1970s concluded that the
FBI’s fifteen-year Cointelpro programs, aimed at civil rights
activists and others on the Left, deliberately used interviews to
disrupt political activities.142 An infamous FBI memorandum
from 1970 advised that interviews could “enhance the paranoia
in these circles” and convey the impression that “there is an FBI
agent behind every mailbox.”143
Even where law enforcement agencies do not
deliberately use interviews to suppress expression, they
acknowledge using them to send a message that government
agents are watching. The Department of Justice explained its
post-9/11 interviews of several thousand Arab immigrants as
an attempt to “sow disruption among potential terrorists,” and
claimed that the interviews “ensured that potential terrorists
sheltering themselves within our communities were aware that
Perceived Abuse and Discrimination After September 11, 2001, with Psychological
Distress, Level of Happiness, and Health Status Among Arab Americans, 100 AM. J.
PUB. HEALTH 284 (2010).
140
See, e.g., Harris, supra note 16, at 165; Horn, supra note 16, at 750-51;
Fisher, supra note 16, at 646-53; Hussain, supra note 16, at 934-38; Lininger, supra
note 16, at 1233-37.
141
Fisher, supra note 16, at 673.
142
SELECT COMM. TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES, U.S. SENATE, FINAL REPORT: SUPPLEMENTARY DETAILED
STAFF REPORTS ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES AND THE RIGHTS OF AMERICANS, S. DOC.
NO. 94-755, at 44 (2d Sess. 1976) [hereinafter CHURCH COMMITTEE REPORT].
143
Socialist Workers Party v. Att’y Gen., 642 F. Supp. 1357, 1389 (S.D.N.Y.
1986) (quoting FBI memo and describing harassing FBI interviews targeting Socialist
Workers Party).
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law enforcement was on the job in their neighborhoods.”144 The
FBI has also explained other interview programs—including
interviews of potential anarchist protestors before the 2004
national political conventions145 and surveillance of Muslims
before that year’s presidential election146—as efforts to deter
acts of violence through obvious surveillance. While using an
investigative technique to dissuade people from committing
violence is not problematic in principle,147 it is unclear that
targets of such practices can distinguish that permissible
message from others potentially received (e.g., “do not protest”
or “do not go to the mosque”).
Thus, when FBI agents interviewed sixty Muslims in
Flint, Michigan, regarding their donations to Muslim American
charities, many donors interpreted the investigation as
intimidation aimed at chilling contributions to Muslim
charities.148 FBI agents visited a number of donors two years in a
row, both times on the “eve of Ramadan,” the Muslim holy
month in which many individuals choose to give religiously
ordained charitable contributions.149 During these visits, two
agents interviewed the donors at their workplaces, while two
others simultaneously interviewed their spouses at home.150 The
inquiries, and particularly the return visits, convinced the
donors that the government sought to intimidate them into not
supporting lawful Muslim charities, with the implied message
that “[i]f you keep giving, we’ll keep coming back at you.”151
Whether or not the government intended that message, the fact
that law enforcement agencies continue to acknowledge using
144

Final Report on Interview Project, supra note 43, at 1, 7.
OVERSIGHT & REVIEW DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE OFFICE OF THE
INSPECTOR GEN., A REVIEW OF THE FBI’S INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITIES CONCERNING
POTENTIAL PROTESTORS AT THE 2004 DEMOCRATIC AND REPUBLICAN NATIONAL
POLITICAL CONVENTIONS 31-34 (2006) [hereinafter A REVIEW OF THE FBI’S
INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITIES CONCERNING POTENTIAL PROTESTORS].
146
CBS News: FBI’s Anti-Terror “October Plan” (CBS television broadcast Sept.
17, 2004), available at http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2004/09/17/eveningnews/
main644096.shtml (reporting “aggressive” and “obvious” surveillance of alleged terrorist
sympathizers and revisiting of mosques to question people about suspicious behavior).
147
See Frederick Schauer, Fear, Risk and the First Amendment: Unraveling
the “Chilling Effect,” 58 B.U. L. REV. 685, 690 (1978) (distinguishing “benign”
deterrence resulting from “intentional regulation of speech or other activity properly
subject to governmental control” from “invidious” chilling of activities protected by the
First Amendment).
148
AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, BLOCKING FAITH, FREEZING CHARITY:
CHILLING MUSLIM CHARITABLE GIVING IN THE “WAR ON TERRORISM FINANCING” 69-73
(2009) [hereinafter BLOCKING FAITH].
149
Id. at 70.
150
Id.
151
Id. at 71.
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interviews to send a message underscores the point that
interviews can serve as an intervention, not just an informationgathering measure.
Indeed, there is powerful anecdotal evidence along with
additional support from ethnographic and empirical studies of
chilling effects on expression in the Muslim community. These
accounts indicate that government investigative practices,
including questioning, have led some U.S. Muslims to avoid
attending political demonstrations or gatherings,152 refrain from
donating to political causes or religious charities,153 avoid
speaking out against U.S. foreign policies or express political
opinions,154 hesitate to join or participate in mosques or
community organizations,155 remove their names from group
membership lists,156 modify their use of the Internet,157 stop
purchasing political books abroad,158 refuse to speak publicly
about law enforcement practices,159 and avoid names or clothing
that express their religious or cultural identities.160 For
instance, a Muslim community leader asserted that the FBI
questioned nearly every donor to one Southern California
mosque, leading to a pronounced decline in donations.161

152

VERA INSTITUTE STUDY, supra note 75, at 66; JUNE HAN, “WE ARE
AMERICANS TOO”: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE EFFECTS OF 9/11 ON SOUTH ASIAN
COMMUNITIES 14 (2006).
153
An extensive ACLU report documented FBI and CBP interviews of donors
to Muslim charities and presented statements of numerous community members who
had stopped giving money in response to questioning of themselves, friends, or family.
BLOCKING FAITH, supra note 148, at 97-100; see also HAN, supra note 152, at 14; VERA
INSTITUTE STUDY, supra note 75, at 66.
154
Teresa Watanabe & Paloma Esquivel, Muslims Say FBI Spying Is Causing
Anxiety: Use of an Informant in Orange County Leads Some to Shun Mosques, L.A.
TIMES, Mar. 1, 2009, at 1; VERA INSTITUTE STUDY, supra note 75, at 58; Matthew
Rothschild, FBI Talks to Muslim High School Student About “PLO” Initials on His
Binder, PROGRESSIVE (Dec. 23, 2005), http://www.progressive.org/mag_mc122305
(reporting that high school student became hesitant to express his political views after
FBI interview apparently triggered by his writing the initials “PLO” on a binder).
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Tyler et al., supra note 87, at 396; Watanabe & Esquivel, supra note 154.
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VERA INSTITUTE STUDY, supra note 75, at 66 (reporting statement of
community organization that membership declined because people called to remove
names from database).
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Sidhu, supra note 16, at 391.
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ASIAN LAW CAUCUS, supra note 34, at 18, 19 (citing examples of
individuals subject to repeated lengthy CBP interviews and searches who no longer
purchase books abroad).
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Carmen, supra note 44.
160
Tyler et al., supra note 87, at 396; Brian Haynes, Extra Scrutiny Chafes
Muslims, LAS VEGAS REV.-J., Oct. 4, 2004, at 1A (describing the decision of one Muslim
convert, who was followed in an airport while reading the Quran, not to adopt a
Muslim name for fear of harassment).
161
Watanabe & Esquivel, supra note 154.
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These claims are largely anecdotal, and one might
question the extent to which individuals and communities have
actually ceased to engage in expression or association. Some
individuals subjected to First Amendment profiling say they
would continue the activities that triggered the scrutiny.162 In
fact, ethnographic studies show that while post-9/11 scrutiny of
Muslims led some people to withdraw from activities that
would identify them as Muslim, Arab, or South Asian, others
became more engaged in civic and political life in an effort to
dispel stereotypes and resist unfair treatment.163 Communities
are not monolithic; they can simultaneously exhibit chilling of
expression and signs of resistance. Both of these responses,
however, stem from the stigma experienced, and thus even the
engagement response should not dispel concern.
In two quantitative studies, members of the U.S.
Muslim community, but not a majority, reported changing their
behavior in response to government scrutiny of their
community. In the study of New York Muslims described
above, one in five surveyed reported altering behavior in
response to general law enforcement scrutiny of Muslims,
including changes in attendance at group prayers in a mosque
(20 percent of respondents), manner of dress (22 percent),
everyday activities (17 percent), and travel behavior (26
percent).164 A 2007 study of Muslim Americans found more
modest changes: while almost three-quarters of Muslims
surveyed believed that the government was monitoring the
general activities and Internet usage of Muslims, only 11.6
percent of respondents reported changing their general
activities due to that concern, and 8.4 percent reported
changing their Internet usage.165
These numbers are not negligible: assuming a population
of two million Muslims in the United States, even 10 percent of
U.S. Muslims represents two hundred thousand people who cease
to engage in lawful expressive behavior for fear of government
scrutiny. In addition, the proportion of individuals who report
changing their behavior might be greater in particular subsets of
the Muslim community: immigrants, working class community
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Tabbaa v. Chertoff, 509 F.3d 89, 102 (2d Cir. 2007).
VERA INSTITUTE STUDY, supra note 75, at 66-67; HAN, supra note 152, at
16-18; Sally Howell & Amaney Jamal, The Aftermath of the 9/11 Attacks, in
CITIZENSHIP AND CRISIS: ARAB DETROIT AFTER 9/11, at 87-88 (2009).
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members, or those who directly experience law enforcement
scrutiny166 might feel particularly vulnerable.
Moreover, studies that measure the extent to which
individuals report changing their behavior may underestimate
the extent of more subtle, but potentially more pervasive,
changes in behavior. A practicing Muslim, for instance, might
not stop going to the mosque, but might hesitate to speak freely
with other worshippers. Other questions (not asked in these
studies) might elicit evidence of subtler changes: “Do you feel
that you must reassure co-workers about your loyalty before
participating in a casual workplace conversation about events
in the Middle East?” “Do you hesitate to speak in Arabic or
perform ritual prayers in public for fear of drawing suspicion?”
Focusing on the hard impacts of surveillance (the
decision to avoid a political gathering) misses the soft impacts
that may affect communities in equal or greater fashion (the
diminished sense of trust in others and openness in
communication). Several scholars have argued that the
surveillance of mosques intrudes on the sense of security that
worshippers seek at a place of worship, and surveillance of any
community-based or political organization diminishes trust
within the group, with longer-term effects on the quality of
association.167 Aziz Huq argues further that law enforcement’s
use of religious speech to signal high-risk terrorist threats
interferes with religious communities’ “epistemic autonomy”—
their “collective interest . . . in determining the content and
direction of . . . religious beliefs without interference by the
government.”168 Thus, any assessment of chilling effects must
take into account the cumulative impact of subtle, smaller
changes and the qualitative aspects of changed behavior.
B.

Suppression and Overbreadth in First Amendment
Profiling

Accepting that First Amendment profiling, at least in
some cases, imposes significant stigmatic costs and chilling
166

Neither study separated out the impact on individuals who had personally
faced law enforcement scrutiny from that of the Muslim community at large.
167
Lininger, supra note 16, at 1233-36; Harris, supra note 16, at 166-68;
Fisher, supra note 16, at 653. See, e.g., Dennis Wagner, FBI’s Queries of Muslims Spurs
Anxiety, ARIZONA REPUBLIC (Oct. 11, 2004, 12:00 AM), http://arizona.indymedia.org/
news/2004/10/22062.php (reporting Muslim community leader’s statement that FBI
interviews led to “creeping distrust,” leading people to question whether acquaintances
might report their words to the government); see also CAINKAR, supra note 20, at 185-86.
168
Huq, supra note 16, at 852-53.
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effects does not tell us whether the practice in a given instance
is justified. Not every law enforcement practice that qualifies
as First Amendment profiling is wrong. For instance, few
would argue that law enforcement should not scrutinize an
influential religious leader advocating terrorist attacks in the
United States or a person who has joined al Qaeda, at least in
order to determine whether the person is actively recruiting or
assisting terrorists. The permissible scope of government
investigation exceeds the permissible scope of government
criminalization: the government may investigate, in an effort to
uncover potential violations of the law or threats to national
security, activities that it cannot constitutionally ban.169 The
government could not, consistent with the First Amendment,
outlaw the advocacy of terrorism or a person’s membership in a
terrorist organization unless those activities cross certain
lines—e.g., the advocacy is directed at producing “imminent
lawless action and is likely to” have such an effect,170 the
member has a specific intent to further the organization’s
illegal aims,171 or either activity constitutes material support to
a designated foreign terrorist organization.172 Such activities,
even without crossing these lines, may be so relevant to
uncovering actual violations of the law that the government
may legitimately investigate them.
These are relatively clear examples; even civil
libertarians might agree that a close enough nexus exists
between the protected activity and an actual threat in order to
permit First Amendment profiling. On these narrow facts, a
three-step justification for First Amendment profiling
articulated by scholars and law enforcement officials seems
least objectionable. First, because of the potential of grave
harm from terrorism, investigators must identify terrorists
early and prevent acts of violence in advance of the commission
of any criminal act.173 Second, these scholars and officials argue,
because terrorists are elusive and hard to find, investigators
need to cast their net broadly to identify those who pose a
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See, e.g., DAVID COLE & JAMES X. DEMPSEY, TERRORISM AND THE
CONSTITUTION: SACRIFICING CIVIL LIBERTIES IN THE NAME OF NATIONAL SECURITY 14
(2002); Fisher, supra note 16, at 672.
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Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (per curiam).
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Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203, 228-30 (1961).
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Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2730-31 (2010).
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RICHARD POSNER, NOT A SUICIDE PACT: THE CONSTITUTION IN A TIME OF
NATIONAL EMERGENCY 114 (2006); Huq, supra note 16, at 839-42.
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threat.174 Third, they argue that where the threat stems from
ideologically motivated violence, evidence of that ideology
(whether religious or political) is a relevant and rational basis
for suspicion.175
Of course, in most cases, the nexus between ideology
and threat will not be as clear. At that point, the justifications
for First Amendment profiling encounter serious questions.
While terrorists may act out of religious or political motivation,
the use of individuals’ religious or political views or behavior to
“predict” threats is fraught with peril. Claims about the
relevance of ideological linkages to violence may appeal to
intuition rather than actual evidence. In fact, research
suggests that the relationship between religion and terrorism
is complicated and contested: for instance, while a New York
Police Department report cites a turn to religion as a risk
factor for “radicalization” and identifies mosques, student
associations, and nongovernmental organizations as examples
of hubs where radicalizing Muslims might gather,176 one
academic study suggests that increased religious education and
greater immersion in Muslim social institutions diminishes the
religious naïveté and social isolation that can feed extremism.177
Even assuming that the “experts” could arrive at an accurate
and sophisticated understanding of the linkages between
terrorism and ideology, there is good reason to question how
well law enforcement agencies could apply that information.178
Beyond these reasons to doubt the effectiveness of First
Amendment profiling, the primary objection rests on a broader
174

POSNER, supra note 173, at 114.
Id. at 116; see also OPERATIONS GUIDE, supra note 102, at 27-28 (providing
examples of where it would be “rational and permissible” for the FBI to consider
religious adherence, affiliations, or practices in an investigation).
176
MITCHELL D. SILBER & ARVIN BHATT, N.Y.C. POLICE DEP’T,
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178
See Huq, supra note 16, at 868-73 (arguing that use of religious speech as a
counterterrorism signal will present high risks of error). Recent news reports on the
biased content of counterterrorism training sessions for law enforcement officials, and the
lack of vetting for self-declared terrorism experts, suggest even greater reason to question
the capability of law enforcement agencies to obtain and apply accurate information on
the relationship between religious beliefs and terrorist threats. See, e.g., Lisa Fernandez,
Local Groups Allege Biased Training Colors FBI Dealings with American Muslims,
MERCURYNEWS.COM, http://www.mercurynews.com/top-stories/ci_19122246 (last updated
Oct. 16, 2011); Dina Temple-Raston, Terrorism Training Casts Pall over Muslim
Employee, NPR (July 18, 2011), http://www.npr.org/2011/07/18/137712352/terrorismtraining-casts-pall-over-muslim-employee.
175

74

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 77:1

principle: where a large number of innocent people engage in
religious or political behavior alleged to be linked to an actual
threat, law enforcement should not define threats so broadly as
to sweep in substantial amounts of protected expression. If, at
one end of the spectrum, an influential religious leader’s
advocacy of terrorist attacks in the United States or a person’s
membership in al Qaeda justifies law enforcement attention,
law enforcement scrutiny directed at those who don Islamic
garb or become active in social causes—behaviors identified by
the New York Police Department report as “signatures” of the
“second stage of radicalization”179—is just as clearly unjustified.
So when is First Amendment profiling actually wrong? I
argue that there are two situations where the government
oversteps its bounds. First, it is wrong for the government to
target people for investigation on account of lawful expression
or association for the purpose of suppressing protected
expression or association (what I label the suppression
concern). Second, First Amendment profiling is wrong to the
extent that the investigation imposes too great a burden on
protected expression in relation to the government interest at
hand (the overbreadth concern).180 Thus, First Amendment
profiling directed at the suppression of protected speech is
presumptively wrong; First Amendment profiling not involving
deliberate suppression is suspect but not categorically wrong.
1. The Suppression Concern
The principle behind the suppression concern is that if
the government cannot criminalize expression, it cannot use
indirect methods of coercion to achieve the same ends. This
principle applies whether the government’s ultimate goal is
illegitimate (suppression of dissent or religious views out of
hostility or self-interest) or legitimate (the prevention of
violence), so long as the immediate objective is suppression of
lawful speech or association. Although one might distinguish,
at a theoretical level, between a purpose to suppress speech
based on hostility to ideas and a purpose to suppress speech to
prevent violence, the distinction collapses in the national179

SILBER & BHATT, supra note 176, at 30-31; see also Huq, supra note 177, at 57.
In using the term “overbreadth,” I am not referring to the separate First
Amendment standing doctrine that allows a party to challenge the constitutionality of
a statute on the grounds that it impermissibly prohibits the speech of others, even if
the party’s own speech could constitutionally be prohibited. See generally Note,
Overbreadth and Listeners’ Rights, 123 HARV. L. REV. 1749 (2010).
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security context, where hostility to ideas almost always takes
the form of a belief that particular ideas are dangerous and
likely to produce harm.181 Thus, the suppression concern
includes the scenario where a government official who believes
that a particular religious movement inspires some individuals
to embrace violence harasses adherents to prevent them from
worshipping together—even if the official’s ultimate purpose is
to forestall acts of violence.
Though investigations today may raise the suppression
concern, there is a relatively broad consensus that the
purposeful use of investigations to suppress lawful expression
is wrong. For instance, the FBI officially proscribes
investigations of First Amendment activities solely for the
purpose of monitoring or abridging lawful expression.182 That
principle stems from wide condemnation of the agency’s
historical abuses: a congressional investigation concluded that
from 1956 to 1971, the FBI had “conducted a sophisticated
vigilante operation aimed squarely at preventing the exercise
of First Amendment rights of speech and association,”183
including the use of wiretaps and bugs to surveil and discredit
Dr. Martin Luther King.184 Despite near consensus today that
investigations should not aim to disrupt lawful speech, that
consensus may shift as federal agencies develop a counterradicalization strategy to prevent and disrupt Islamic
extremism within the United States, leading to renewed debate
over government-sponsored efforts to suppress speech.185
2. The Overbreadth Concern
Second, though less obvious, First Amendment profiling
raises the concern that regardless of motive—even assuming
that law enforcement agents are acting for the legitimate
purpose of investigating a terrorist threat—the government
181

Thus, in this context, the distinction Elena Kagan draws between
“ideological” and “harm-based” motives for government actions collapses—as Kagan
anticipated in suggesting that in certain cases, “the two kinds of motives become
hopelessly entangled . . . in a kind of endless feedback loop.” Elena Kagan, Private
Speech, Public Purpose: The Role of Governmental Motive in First Amendment
Doctrine, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 413, 433-35 (1996).
182
MUKASEY GUIDELINES, supra note 38, at 13.
183
CHURCH COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 142, at 3.
184
See id. at 81-86. For other examples of FBI investigations focused on First
Amendment expression, see generally COLE & DEMPSEY, supra note 169.
185
See Ken Dilanian, Fighting Threats from Within: Homegrown Terrorist
Plots Spur a Search for a Strategy, but How Does the Government Battle an Ideology?,
L.A. TIMES, May 27, 2010, at 1.
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may have defined threats too broadly, overclassifying innocent
expression and association to improperly create a legitimate
basis for scrutiny. There are two reasons why law enforcement
investigations with a legitimate purpose should raise First
Amendment concerns. First, even where the purpose of an
investigation is not the suppression of expression, hostility to
that expression may well influence the scope and shape of the
investigation.186 In Tabbaa, for example, CBP officials ordered
intrusive screening measures on Muslims returning from a
conference as a response to intelligence concerning the presence
of suspected terrorists at the event. But unspoken assumptions
that an Islamic conference was likely to be suspicious might well
have colored the judgment that it was rational—and fair—to stop
all people returning from a diverse gathering of thirteen thousand
people based on the possibility that they may have met a terrorist
at the event.187 The unpopular and subordinate status of the
communities affected may color threat perceptions, reduce
empathy for innocent people affected by an investigation, or
diminish fears of political backlash.188 For instance, the
knowledge that political leaders and the U.S. public would not
raise howls of protest at the singling out of participants at an
Islamic conference might well have lessened the perceived costs
of a decision to target them.
The second reason for the overbreadth concern is that
even where hostility to speech or speakers does not influence
an investigation, First Amendment profiling is likely to result
in particularly grave harms. Where an investigative decision
on its face turns on First Amendment expression or association,
it is particularly likely to result in stigmatic harm and chilled
186

See Kagan, supra note 181, at 435 (arguing that hostility to speech may
lead the government to overestimate the harm the speech may cause).
187
One commentator writes of Tabbaa that questioning attendees at an Islamic
conference based on the presence of a suspected terrorist is no more “profiling” than
questioning attendees at a State Fair for similar reasons, because it does not rely on
stereotyping but on “suspect description.” R. Richard Banks, Group Harms in Antiterrorism
Efforts: A Pervasive Problem with No Simple Solution, 117 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 198, 199
(2008), http://yalelawjournal.org/the-yale-law-journal-pocket-part/civil-rights/group-harmsin-antiterrorism-efforts:-a-pervasive-problem-with-no-simple-solution/.
This
conclusion
overlooks the likelihood of group-based assumptions behind investigators’ decisions: it is
hard to imagine that CBP would have detained, fingerprinted, and photographed everyone
returning from a state fair attended by thirteen thousand people rather than choosing more
tailored means to identify those who posed a threat.
188
See Paul Brest, Foreword: In Defense of the Antidiscrimination Principle,
90 HARV. L. REV. 1, 7-8 (1976) (arguing that government decisions not based on racial
animus may still be affected by “racially selective sympathy and indifference” to other
racial groups); see also Hussain, supra note 16, at 945 (discussing possibility of
unconscious and cognitive biases in investigative decisions).
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expression. Consider a hypothetical in which the FBI,
responding to the attempted Times Square bomber Faisal
Shahzad’s claims that U.S. drone attacks in Pakistan
motivated him,189 began questioning hundreds of people who
signed a petition protesting civilian deaths from drone strikes.
The FBI might justify the interviews as an intelligence
assessment to measure potential threats presented by
Pakistani Americans opposed to U.S. policies. While such an
inquiry might have a “legitimate” purpose—at least one that
the current attorney general guidelines deems proper—the
means employed would be well out of proportion to the declared
objective and seriously likely to discourage others from voicing
similar opposition to U.S. policies. Even where hostility to the
ideas expressed does not influence an investigation, the
government’s use of First Amendment expression as a basis for
selecting interviewees can result in grave harm to those
questioned and their broader communities.
In recent years, some federal agencies have themselves
concluded that certain investigative or intelligence activities
they conducted were overbroad. For instance, the Department of
Homeland Security distributed and then rescinded intelligence
on certain First Amendment activities of U.S. Muslims, deeming
it a violation of department policy.190 A Department of Justice
Inspector General review of the FBI’s investigations of several
domestic advocacy groups concluded that while the FBI did not
deliberately target groups on account of their First Amendment
activities, it had weak factual support for opening or continuing
certain investigations.191
The overbreadth concern also draws support from history:
David Cole and James Dempsey have argued, for instance, that
the FBI investigation in the 1980s of the Committee in Support
for the People of El Salvador, a peaceful political organization,
continued and expanded despite a slim factual basis for concern.192
189

Benjamin Weiser, A Guilty Plea in Plot to Bomb Times Square, N.Y. TIMES,
June 22, 2010, at A1.
190
Sebastian Rotella, Intelligence Note on Nation of Islam Pulled: Homeland
Security Rescinds the 2007 Analysis After Deciding It Broke Rules on Information
Collection, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 17, 2009, at A26.
191
OVERSIGHT & REVIEW DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE OFFICE OF THE
INSPECTOR GEN., A REVIEW OF THE FBI’S INVESTIGATION OF CERTAIN DOMESTIC
ADVOCACY GROUPS 186-87 (2010). But see A REVIEW OF THE FBI’S INVESTIGATIVE
ACTIVITIES CONCERNING POTENTIAL PROTESTORS, supra note 145, at 3 (finding that the
FBI did not improperly target potential protestors at national political conventions to
chill First Amendment activities).
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COLE & DEMPSEY, supra note 169, at 22-23.
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The FBI later admitted that the investigation, which generated
files on 2376 individuals and 1330 groups, was improperly focused
on First Amendment activities.193
The most difficult challenge, of course, is making a
coherent distinction between permissible First Amendment
profiling and impermissible overbreadth, especially in
interviews. Indeed, the overbreadth concern, unlike the
suppression concern, does not suggest any bright line. Rather,
overbreadth suggests a contextual, case-by-case determination
of whether there is a tight enough nexus between the targeted
expression and an actual threat of violence to justify the
particular burden on First Amendment rights.
Two examples of actual interviews involving First
Amendment profiling might help illustrate relevant
considerations. First, as this article has argued, the First
Amendment profiling in Tabbaa was overbroad, and the case
was wrongly decided. There, the concern was the possibility of
individuals using the mainstream gathering as a cover for
meeting terrorist suspects. The size of the event (thirteen
thousand participants), however, made any individual
participant’s probability of meeting suspects fairly small. In
addition, the security measures taken, including interviews,
lengthy detentions, fingerprinting, and the like were
particularly stigmatizing and intrusive. Moreover, surveillance
of specific suspects at the conference itself, which presumably
could have been arranged through the cooperation of the
Canadian government, suggested a ready alternative.194 Given
these facts, the nexus between the alleged security threat and
the First Amendment trigger for the selection of interviewees—
attendance at the conference—was too attenuated to justify the
particularly burdensome measures taken.
Second, a more difficult case might be the FBI’s
numerous interviews of students who attended a sixteen-day
Houston Islamic conference in 2008 that Umar Farouk
Abdulmutallab, the Nigerian man who attempted to blow up an

193

Id. at 24, 33.
The Tabbaa court rejected this alternative on the grounds that “the U.S.
government cannot freely conduct surveillance . . . in Canada,” without any
explanation of why U.S. authorities could not coordinate with Canadian law
enforcement to arrange any required surveillance. Tabbaa v. Chertoff, 509 F.3d 89, 104
(2d Cir. 2007).
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airliner in December 2009, also attended.195 The conference was
sponsored by an Islamic religious institute known to teach a
particularly conservative brand of Islam, though it did not
advocate violence.196 Following the attempted bombing, the FBI
initially sought to interview all 156 participants and indeed
interviewed an unknown (but apparently large) number.197
Perhaps the FBI reasoned that other students who attended
could provide information on Abdulmutallab, that a teacher at
the conference might have influenced both Abdulmutallab and
other attendees, or that the conference might have brought
together like-minded individuals. How should we evaluate this
case, which at first glance bears some resemblance to Tabbaa?
Several considerations inform this inquiry. One
consideration involves the burden imposed: the FBI interviews
likely did not create the same direct burden as the compulsory
and extensive screening measures taken in Tabbaa. On the
other hand, especially if the FBI approached all or nearly all
the 156 participants, these interviews may well have chilled
those who would otherwise wish to attend the institute’s
events. A second consideration is the strength of the nexus
between the potential terrorist threat and the First
Amendment trigger. Here, there had been an actual terrorist
attempt, and compared to Tabbaa, the relatively small number
of participants and the duration of the conference suggests a
greater probability of other students having met
Abdulmutallab or some other common source of influence. Also
relevant is that a “tiny fraction” of the institute’s other
students (not those subject to the interviews) had turned to
violence.198 A third consideration is the scope of the questioning:
to the extent it focused on Abdulmutallab, it would be much
less problematic than broad-based inquiries that supposed that
the interviewees at large presented a threat. Ultimately,
whether these interviews were overbroad might come down to
the strength of the FBI’s preexisting evidence that the institute
attracted students drawn to violence and the scale and content
of the interviews conducted.
These examples suggest the complexity of the factspecific inquiry required for determining overbreadth. Though
195

Andrea Elliott, Why Yasir Qadhi Wants to Talk About Jihad, N.Y. TIMES,
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deciding when First Amendment profiling is permissible may
not be easy, the real stigma and chilling effects of the practice,
combined with the historical record of abuses, make that
inquiry critical. In the next part, I argue that courts should
undertake that inquiry through heightened scrutiny of First
Amendment profiling, and that existing First Amendment
doctrine provides a foundation for such review.
III.

FIRST AMENDMENT PROFILING IN THE COURTS

Given the dual concerns of suppression and overbreadth
raised by First Amendment profiling, courts ought to subject
investigations involving First Amendment profiling, including
interviews, to heightened scrutiny whenever plaintiffs
establish that they have faced a substantial burden on their
First Amendment rights to freedom of speech or association.199
This article proposes a two-part test for such cases. A court
should inquire first whether the government had a compelling
interest in conducting the practice in question. In that step, the
government will usually be able to prevail, citing national
security, except in the rare case where direct evidence indicates
a purpose to suppress speech or some other illegitimate reason
for an investigation—in which case, the government would lose
without further balancing. Assuming that the government
establishes a compelling interest, the court should then query
whether the means employed were “narrowly tailored” to
serving the declared objective. The availability of less
restrictive means for the government to resolve security
concerns ought to create a rebuttable presumption that the
investigation was overbroad. This heightened scrutiny would
be neither traditional strict scrutiny weighted heavily against
constitutionality nor a deferential balancing analysis in which
the government always wins.200
While suppression and overbreadth are conceptually
distinct, the test here would seek to address both concerns. The
existence of a suppression purpose on the facts of any particular
case can often be detected only from a demonstration of
199

I focus in this article on the First Amendment rights to freedom of speech
and association, which cover religious speech and association, rather than the separate
religion clauses of the First Amendment.
200
A point of comparison might be the approach in freedom of association
claims, where courts query whether state interests may be achieved by other means
“significantly less restrictive of associational freedoms,” Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S.
609, 622 (1984), not whether the means employed were the least restrictive alternative.
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overbreadth. When government agents conduct an investigation
in order to suppress protected speech, the invidious purpose is
rarely apparent; law enforcement will almost always provide
some facially legitimate reason for an improper investigation.
Thus, the most plausible route to “uncover” an actual
suppression purpose is through demonstrating such a remote
connection between the investigated activity and an actual
threat, or a burden on speech so disproportionate to the declared
objective as to support the inference that no legitimate
investigative purpose existed.201
I do not argue that courts, as opposed to Congress or
administrative agencies, are necessarily best positioned to
resolve First Amendment concerns regarding law enforcement
investigations. Others have extensively debated the
effectiveness and desirability of judicial enforcement of civil
rights claims.202 But political process theory suggests that
where
terrorism
investigations
predominantly
affect
communities that are subject to widespread public hostility,
Congress and executive agencies may lack the political will to
fully resolve concerns stemming from such investigations.203
While executive oversight institutions, such as the Department
of Justice Inspector General, have triggered impressive reform
of certain investigative practices, even strong Inspector
General reviews may not substantially constrain agency
discretion to prevent future abuse, and these institutions
cannot define substantive rights that would bind agency
conduct.204 Moreover, even if agency policies and guidelines are
more likely to directly influence law enforcement behavior than
court decisions, court decisions often set the baseline for agency
guidelines: the FBI’s Domestic Investigations and Operations
Guide, for instance, references judicial opinions heavily in
outlining First Amendment constraints on investigations.205
201

See Kagan, supra note 181, at 440-41.
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The case for heightened scrutiny is justifiable, though
not compelled, by existing law. The law on First Amendment
profiling is deeply unsettled, as lower courts since the 1970s
have struggled to answer the many questions the Supreme
Court has left open. The first important question that has
divided lower courts evaluating First Amendment profiling
involves the circumstances in which plaintiffs challenging law
enforcement investigations have suffered sufficient abridgment
of their First Amendment rights. The harm from law
enforcement investigations is less direct and certain than the
harm from classic restrictions on speech or associational rights
because investigations do not typically prohibit someone from
expressing a view or associating with an organization. Lower
courts since the 1970s have primarily confronted the question of
sufficient harm as an issue of standing, and many have denied
standing to plaintiffs challenging surveillance or investigations.
Despite the restrictive standing doctrine created in this context,
I argue that lower court decisions, and the Supreme Court
precedent on which they rely, suggest that some plaintiffs
challenging law enforcement interviews would be able to
establish standing—overcoming a threshold hurdle that has
stymied other First Amendment claims against covert
surveillance or the observation of religious or political events.
While plaintiffs will still need to establish, on the merits, that
they suffered substantial harm, standing doctrine in this context
already screens out most cases involving minimal harm, and the
stigmatic and chilling effects of interviews should further help
plaintiffs demonstrate the seriousness of harm suffered.
A second question that has divided lower courts is
whether the government’s articulation of a plausible legitimate
purpose for a law enforcement investigation ends the First
Amendment inquiry, or whether courts ought to apply
heightened scrutiny to probe the “fit” between the claimed
purpose and the means employed—either because heightened
scrutiny is required to uncover an illicit motive (the
suppression concern) or because even an investigation with an
acknowledged legitimate purpose may still sweep too broadly
in burdening First Amendment rights (the overbreadth
concern). Despite the fundamental importance of this question,
only one recent piece—an article by Lawrence Rosenthal
discussed below—has discussed this divide, concluding that
First Amendment investigations need not satisfy heightened
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scrutiny.206 I examine the split among lower courts on First
Amendment profiling and challenge the view that First
Amendment doctrine does not support heightened scrutiny for
investigations. In doing so, I address the most significant
objection to this view: the idea that narrow tailoring
requirements would undermine the ability of law enforcement
to identify and preempt potential threats.
A.

The Harm from Investigations
1. The Supreme Court’s Chilling Effects Cases Through
Laird

In the 1950s and 1960s, the Supreme Court made clear
that government actions that indirectly burden, rather than
directly restrict, speech or association could violate the First
Amendment.207 Several classic cases establishing this principle
arose out of investigations or inquiries into the membership of
the National Association for the Advancement of Colored
People (NAACP) or “subversive” organizations. Thus, in
NAACP v. Alabama, the Supreme Court held that the state of
Alabama had failed to show a compelling justification for
requiring the NAACP to disclose its membership list, which the
state sought as part of an investigation into whether the group
had complied with a corporate registration requirement.208 The
Court recognized that although the requirement did not
directly abridge NAACP members’ freedom to associate, the
practical consequence of disclosure would be to subject
members to public threats and reprisals—and chill the
organization’s lawful political advocacy.209
Although in many cases, the Court surely suspected an
illicit government motive behind an investigation—the
suppression concern—these decisions did not conclude that the
government purposes articulated were pretextual or
implausible. For instance, in Shelton v. Tucker, the Court
explicitly acknowledged the state’s legitimate interest in
investigating a public employee’s associational ties, but
206
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nevertheless concluded that that interest did not justify the
breadth of the inquiry undertaken.210
Moreover, the Court sometimes proved willing to engage
in a rigorous examination of the facts in finding an insufficient
“fit” between the state interest articulated and the informationgathering measure employed. Thus, in Gibson v. Florida
Legislative Investigative Committee, the Court held that while
state legislatures had broad power to investigate possible
subversive activities, a Florida legislative committee’s demand
that the NAACP disclose whether fourteen “known”
Communists were members of the association was not
supported by “a substantial relation between the information
sought and a subject of overriding and compelling state
interest.”211 The state presented colorable evidence of
Communist attempts to participate in the NAACP: some of the
fourteen alleged Communists had attended NAACP meetings,
one informant had “been instructed to infiltrate the NAACP,”
the organization had passed “antisubversion” resolutions that
acknowledged attempts by Communists to take over the group,
and one or two of the fourteen had given talks to the
organization or distributed leaflets for the group.212 Yet the
Court rejected this evidence, fact by fact, as “merely indirect,
less than unequivocal, and mostly hearsay testimony.”213
Without deferring to either the government’s explanation for
the investigation or its interpretation of the facts, the Court
conducted its own, searching inquiry into whether the evidence
justified the investigation.214
In these cases, the Court explicitly characterized the
harm resulting from government investigative practices as the
chilling effect such practices would have on legitimate
expression and association. For instance, Alabama’s attempt to
compel disclosure of the NAACP’s membership would hinder
the group’s advocacy efforts by dissuading individuals from
participating out of fear of exposure.215 Less explicitly, the
decisions recognize that the chilling effect on First Amendment
210
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rights results from an exercise of state power that subjects
individuals to stigma—either directly or by exposing people to
public hostility. In NAACP v. Alabama, the Court compared
the compelled disclosure of group affiliation to a “requirement
that adherents of particular religious faiths or political parties
wear identifying armbands,” drawing an implicit connection to
the branding of minority or dissenting communities.216 In a case
involving legislative investigations into First Amendment
views, the Court noted that such investigations could impose
the “stain of the stamp of disloyalty” as significant as might
result from an actual loss of employment.217
In spite of these decisions recognizing the stigmatic
harm and chilling effects of indirect government burdens on
expression, in 1972, the Court curbed the practical reach of
these doctrines by restricting standing to challenge
surveillance. In Laird v. Tatum, the Court announced that
while indirect burdens on First Amendment rights might
warrant constitutional review, individuals did not have
standing to challenge government surveillance that created
only a “subjective ‘chill’” on political activities.218 Laird remains
the Court’s last word on First Amendment claims against
government surveillance of political activities, and has
profoundly affected First Amendment challenges to law
enforcement investigations and surveillance.
In Laird, a group of political activists and organizations
sought to enjoin the army’s collection of intelligence regarding
their lawful political activities,219 claiming that the army had
surveilled them and continued to maintain files regarding their
political activities.220 The army acknowledged conducting
surveillance (mostly through public sources such as the news
media and attendance at public meetings) of political activities
with the potential to result in civil disorder.221 The Court
distinguished the surveillance in Laird from past “‘chilling’
effect” cases, where “the challenged exercise of governmental
power was regulatory, proscriptive, or compulsory in nature,”
and plaintiffs were or would be “subject to the regulations,
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proscriptions, or compulsions” that they were contesting.222 For
instance, in past cases, plaintiffs stood to lose out on state bar
membership or employment if they did not take loyalty oaths or
answer questions about their political associations.223 In Laird,
by contrast, the Court characterized the plaintiffs’ claims as
arising from “the mere existence, without more, of a
governmental investigative and data-gathering activity that is
alleged to be broader in scope than is reasonably necessary for
the accomplishment of a valid governmental purpose.”224 A
“subjective ‘chill’” alone, such as the plaintiffs’ fears that the
army might in the future misuse the information it had collected
against them, could not substitute for a “claim of specific present
objective harm or a threat of specific future harm.”225
Although Laird did not address the merits of the plaintiffs’
First Amendment claims, the five-to-four opinion suggested a
reluctance to credit the stigma of general surveillance in the
absence of other state action directly affecting the plaintiffs. But
the Court dealt there with information-gathering from largely
public sources, noting that the lower court described the
investigation as uncovering no more than what a good newspaper
reporter might uncover from attending meetings and clipping
articles.226 The plaintiffs did not allege any law enforcement
interviews of individuals or intimidating contacts between
individuals and army officers, and learned of the army’s
surveillance through a magazine article that described the
program.227 The Court qualified its concern over federal courts
monitoring “the wisdom and soundness of Executive action” by
making clear that an actual or immediately threatened injury
could properly subject army surveillance to judicial review.228
Thus, the Court left open the ability of courts to scrutinize
overbroad and stigmatizing investigations in a case where
plaintiffs could demonstrate “objective” harm.
2. Establishing Standing for Interviews, Post-Laird
Since Laird, lower courts facing First Amendment
claims against law enforcement investigations have grappled
222
223
224
225
226
227
228
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with the threshold question of whether the plaintiffs have
standing to sue. A review of these decisions suggests that at
least some plaintiffs challenging law enforcement interviews as
unjustified or overbroad should be able to establish standing.
In the case of CBP interviews, where travelers cannot
enter the United States without satisfying border inspectors,
Laird is unlikely to present a challenge. Beyond a chilling
effect, individuals interviewed on account of First Amendment
expression can point to objective harm from interviews,
minimally the detention they experienced—often in addition to
intrusive searches, handcuffing or displays of physical force, or
other screening measures.229 In contexts involving the compelled
disclosure of information, the Supreme Court has never held
that organizations or individuals personally subject to that
compulsion lacked standing. Although CBP presumably cannot
deny entry altogether to U.S. citizens who refuse to speak, CBP
can delay entry or subject people to more intense searches;
even with a legal right to enter, U.S. citizens must still await
the permission of border inspectors. Thus, for purposes of
standing, courts should view border interviews as a type of
involuntary detention, creating an objective injury.
FBI interviews, by contrast, present a more difficult
question because they are ostensibly voluntary, and plaintiffs
will not always be able to establish objective injury beyond the
stigma or chilling effects of the practice. As Scott Michelman and
others have described, some courts have interpreted Laird
broadly to foreclose standing for claims of chilling effect injuries
that did not arise out “of ‘regulatory, proscriptive, or compulsory’
government action.”230 For instance, the lead opinion in a Sixth
Circuit case adopted this position and denied standing to
plaintiffs who challenged the National Security Administration’s
warrantless wiretapping program; the plaintiffs could not
establish that they were “regulated, constrained, or compelled
directly by the government’s” program.231
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Standing was not an issue in Tabbaa, for instance, where on the merits the
Second Circuit found that even without the “clear chilling of future expressive activity,”
the screening measures imposed a significant penalty on plaintiffs. Tabbaa v. Chertoff,
509 F.3d 89, 101 (2d Cir. 2007).
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Courts that embrace the broad view of Laird might find
that chilling-effects claims arising out of FBI interviews are
nonjusticiable since individuals need not agree to the
interviews. On the other hand, plaintiffs approached by the
FBI for interviews are subject to direct, personal contact with
law enforcement making a request of them—in contrast to the
surveillance in Laird, which did not require individuals to do
anything at all.
Moreover, other courts have not interpreted Laird so
broadly as to foreclose First Amendment standing in the absence
of “regulatory, proscriptive, or compulsory” government action.
Rather, many courts distinguished cases where litigants showed
only a “subjective ‘chill’”232 from cases where plaintiffs
established an “objective” chill, or specific adverse effects, from
surveillance or investigations. Most recently, the Second Circuit
held that plaintiffs who had taken costly measures to avoid
surveillance of their international communications in reasonable
fear of being monitored had standing to challenge a new foreign
intelligence surveillance law.233
These decisions espouse a narrower view of Laird and
suggest at least three bases for asserting justiciable challenges
to FBI interviews that burden free expression and association.
First, plaintiffs can establish standing where they demonstrate
that interviews were aimed at disrupting speech or lawful
activities or were undertaken in bad faith.234
(D.C. Cir. 1984) (denying standing where plaintiffs could not show that executive orders
authorizing intelligence collection commanded or prohibited them from doing anything).
232
Thus, several courts dismissed challenges to otherwise legal law
enforcement data-gathering, photography, and physical surveillance at political events
open to the public. See, e.g., Phila. Yearly Meeting of Religious Soc’y of Friends v. Tate,
519 F.2d 1335, 1337-38 (3d Cir. 1975); Fifth Ave. Peace Parade Comm. v. Gray, 480
F.2d 326, 330-33 (2d Cir. 1973); Donohoe v. Duling, 465 F.2d 196, 202 (4th Cir. 1972).
One court, finding no tangible harm, denied standing to students and teachers who
claimed that the placement of an undercover police officer in two high school classes
was ideologically motivated and stifled classroom discussion. Gordon v. Warren Consol.
Bd. of Educ., 706 F.2d 778, 780-81 (6th Cir. 1983).
233
Amnesty Int’l USA v. Clapper, 638 F.3d 118, 121-22 (2d Cir. 2011).
234
See, e.g, Anderson v. Davila, 125 F.3d 148, 160 (3d Cir. 1997)
(distinguishing Laird where plaintiff alleged that government surveilled him in
retaliation for exercise of First Amendment rights); Alliance to End Repression v. City
of Chicago, 627 F. Supp. 1044, 1047, 1050-52 (N.D. Ill. 1985) (finding standing where
Chicago police placed informants and undercover agents in senior positions in
organizations in order to “neutralize” their influence); Founding Church of Scientology
of Wash., D.C. v. Dir., Fed. Bureau of Investigation, 459 F. Supp. 748, 760 (D.D.C.
1978) (ruling that Church of Scientology had standing where alleged that federal
government had disrupted the organization and interfered with its activities); Berlin
Democratic Club v. Rumsfeld, 410 F. Supp. 144, 149-51 (D.D.C. 1976) (holding that
plaintiffs had standing to contest surveillance activities that included terminating
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Second, plaintiffs can overcome Laird where the FBI’s
actions cause individuals objective harm, such as damage to
reputations or employment prospects. This type of harm
sometimes occurs when FBI agents approach individuals at
work and announce to employers that they want to investigate
an employee. Indeed, in another context, the Supreme Court
distinguished reputational injuries as a basis for standing from
the chilling effects found nonjusticiable in Laird.235 Lower
courts have allowed individuals to challenge employmentrelated government loyalty investigations,236 the public
disclosure of information on individuals targeted,237 and even
the harm resulting from retention of an investigative file that
carried a risk of potential future disclosure.238
Third, an organization that has experienced an
identifiable decline in membership, support, or reputation from
FBI interviews, such as a mosque whose congregants are
questioned, could sue on its own behalf. Courts have ruled that
organizations have standing to contest law enforcement
investigative practices that dissuaded their members from
participating and thereby caused the institutions tangible harm,
such as a decline in membership or participation.239 For instance,
the Ninth Circuit found that churches sheltering refugees had
standing to challenge surveillance of their activities because the
chilling impact on their members concretely impaired the
churches from carrying out their ministries.240

plaintiffs’ employment and disrupting lawful activities); Lowenstein v. Rooney, 401 F.
Supp. 952, 957-60 (E.D.N.Y. 1975) (finding standing where former congressional
candidate alleged that FBI conspired in bad faith to investigate him for political
activities); Handschu v. Special Servs. Div., 349 F. Supp. 766, 770 (S.D.N.Y. 1972)
(finding standing where plaintiffs alleged injuries resulting from use of secret
informants who induced and initiated criminal activity).
235
Meese v. Keene, 481 U.S. 465, 473-75 (1987) (holding that state legislator
who sought to exhibit foreign films had standing to challenge statutory scheme labeling
the films “political propaganda” because of potential harm to his reputation and
professional interests).
236
Ozonoff v. Berzak, 744 F.2d 224, 229-30 (1st Cir. 1984); Clark v. Library of
Cong., 750 F.2d 89, 96-98 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
237
Riggs v. City of Albuquerque, 916 F.2d 582, 586 (10th Cir. 1990); Religious
Soc’y of Friends, 519 F.2d at 1339; Jabara v. Kelley, 476 F. Supp. 561, 568 (E.D. Mich.
1979), vacated on other grounds sub nom. Jabara v. Webster, 691 F.2d 272 (6th Cir. 1982).
238
Paton v. La Prade, 524 F.2d 862, 868 (3d Cir. 1975).
239
Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.) v. United States, 870 F.2d 518, 521-22 (9th
Cir. 1989); Socialist Workers Party v. Att’y Gen., 419 U.S. 1314, 1319 (1974) (Marshall, J.)
(finding standing where organization alleged that presence of informants at convention
would dissuade delegates from participating and jeopardize employment); see also Muslim
Cmty. Ass’n of Ann Arbor v. Ashcroft, 459 F. Supp. 2d 592, 601 (E.D. Mich. 2006).
240
Presbyterian Church, 870 F.2d at 521-22.
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While Laird imposes a significant threshold requirement
that could screen out many FBI encounters—even large-scale
interviews with significant chilling effects, where plaintiffs did
not have evidence of bad faith or tangible injuries—it does not
foreclose First Amendment challenges to CBP or FBI interviews.
3. Beyond Standing: Establishing Sufficient Harm to
First Amendment Rights
Even where courts find standing, they would still need
to consider the extent of the harm, either as a threshold
inquiry into whether the harms are “substantial,”241 or at a
minimum, in determining whether plaintiffs’ injuries ought to
prevail against governmental interests.242 Interviews that
survive Laird’s standing doctrine will usually be those where
the government effectively penalized or compelled plaintiffs in
some way, as in FBI interviews that cause reputational or
economic damage or compulsory CBP inspections.
For CBP interviews, the compulsion involved brings
potential challenges within the ambit of the Court’s historic
chilling effect cases, where the government threatened to
withhold a concrete benefit based on protected expression.
When CBP prevents individuals who have engaged in protected
expression from entering the country until they comply with
extensive and unusual CBP interviews, those individuals
experience an actual restraint at least as severe as that
invalidated in Lamont v. Postmaster General.243 There, the
Court struck down a rule preventing the delivery of foreign
mail that the Post Office determined was “communist political
propaganda” until recipients first sent in a reply card
affirmatively requesting the delivery.244 Though sending a reply
card to receive mail did not create the same burden as, say, an
employment requirement to disclose one’s political affiliations,
241

See, e.g., Tabbaa v. Chertoff, 509 F.3d 89, 101-02 (2d Cir. 2007) (evaluating
whether burden on freedom of association was “substantial”).
242
See, e.g., Meese v. Keene, 481 U.S. 465 (1987) (distinguishing extent of harm for
standing purposes from merits inquiry); Socialist Workers Party, 419 U.S. at 1316 (same).
243
381 U.S. 301, 307 (1965). Whether the First Amendment analysis would
differ in border inspections of individuals who are not U.S. citizens or lawful
permanent residents is beyond the scope of this paper. While noncitizens residing in
the United States enjoy First Amendment rights, Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 148
(1945), some courts have rejected First Amendment challenges with respect to certain
immigration decisions. See Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S.
471, 488 (1999); Price v. INS, 962 F.2d 836, 841 (9th Cir. 1992).
244
Lamont, 381 U.S. at 307.
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the Court found the constraint presented by the regulation
sufficient to implicate the First Amendment.245 The stigma
imposed by the designation of certain mail as “communist
political propaganda,” not just the degree of restraint, made the
burden on First Amendment rights significant; the Court
recognized that such a designation would deter individuals
from reading “what the Federal Government says contains the
seeds of treason” and has “condemned.”246
In both FBI and CBP interviews, the stigma resulting
from a person’s selection for questioning on account of First
Amendment activities should help plaintiffs establish that a
law enforcement encounter effectively penalized them for
engaging in protected expression. That reasoning appeared in
Tabbaa, where the Second Circuit relied on the stigma of the
investigative measures taken to conclude that they imposed a
substantial disability on the plaintiffs’ First Amendment
rights. The court found that the extensive security measures
the plaintiffs experienced, “when others, who had not attended
the conference, did not have to endure these measures,”
qualified as a significant “penalty” and one that might
reasonably deter others from attending similar conferences.247
In other words, the fact of being singled out for this type of
scrutiny, not just the “tangible” harm from the screening
measures employed, led the court to find that the investigation
substantially interfered with freedom of association.
As discussed above, the Supreme Court’s classic First
Amendment cases of the 1950s and 1960s explicitly recognized
chilling effects, and implicitly recognized stigma, as a basis for
harm.248 Moreover, the Court frequently noted that the chilling
effects on speech or association in those cases were grave
precisely because the groups or individuals being investigated
espoused dissenting or unpopular views.249 Thus, the Court
considered the actual burden of investigations on the specific
communities involved in the specific social and political
atmosphere of the time—a backdrop of hostility toward the
civil rights movement and pervasive fear of communism.
Courts examining the harm of First Amendment profiling
245

Id.
Id.
247
Tabbaa v. Chertoff, 509 F.3d 89, 102 (2d Cir. 2007).
248
See supra notes 214-16 and accompanying text.
249
See Gibson v. Fla. Legislative Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539, 555-57
(1963); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 486-87 & n.7 (1960); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel.
Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 462 (1958).
246
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today could—and should—consider broader discrimination and
hostility to U.S. Muslims in evaluating the extent to which
interviews stigmatize targets and chill expression.
Beyond the First Amendment context, the Court has
continued to consider stigmatic harm a judicially cognizable
injury. In the equal protection context, the Court recognizes—as
it did most famously in Brown v. Board of Education250—that
discrimination imposes a noneconomic injury by “stigmatizing
members of the disfavored group” as “less worthy participants in
the political community.”251 The Court considers stigma, when
accompanied by more tangible harm, a factor in determining
what procedural protections the Due Process Clause requires252
and as an important reason that laws prohibiting private,
consensual sexual acts between persons of the same sex violate
substantive due process.253 In criminal procedure, the Court has
justified rigorous procedural protections partly because of the
stigma imposed by a criminal conviction.254
Thus, the fact that law enforcement interviews do not
prohibit someone from expressing a view or associating with an
organization should not categorically prevent individuals
subjected to FBI or CBP interviews from establishing sufficient
harm to First Amendment interests, either as a matter of
standing doctrine or substantive law. Plaintiffs will be on stronger
ground, however, where they can point to stigma and chilling
effects in addition to more “objective” compulsion or harm.
B.

Suppression, Overbreadth, and Heightened Scrutiny in
the Lower Courts

Post-Laird cases involving challenges to First Amendment
profiling suggest broad agreement that the First Amendment
bars investigations that are directed at an illegitimate purpose.
But courts divide as to whether a showing of a legitimate purpose
ends the First Amendment inquiry, or whether investigations
with a legitimate purpose may still sweep too broadly in
burdening free speech, association, and religion as to violate the
250

347 U.S. 483, 494-95 (1954).
Heckler v. Mathews, 465 U.S. 728, 739-40 (1984) (citation omitted). See
Lenhardt, supra note 138, at 864-78 (discussing Supreme Court cases on racial stigma).
252
Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701 (1976). See Eric J. Mitnick, Procedural
Due Process and Reputational Harm: Liberty as Self-Invention, 43 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
79, 91 (2009) (criticizing limitations of “stigma-plus” doctrine).
253
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 575 (2003).
254
Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 484 (2000).
251
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First Amendment. And courts divide further as to whether
heightened scrutiny should apply to such investigations.
Lower court decisions in First Amendment challenges to
law enforcement investigations have generally concluded that
the First Amendment bars investigations that are undertaken
for the purpose of stifling dissent or interfering with lawful
expressive activities. Beginning in the 1970s, a series of
lawsuits challenged federal law enforcement and local police
investigative practices that allegedly aimed to stifle dissent.
Beyond finding standing where the law enforcement practices
in question appeared to go beyond “legitimate surveillance,”255 a
number of courts held that investigations taken for the purpose
of harassment, interference with lawful activities, or
suppression of speech would violate the First Amendment.256
For instance, in Hobson v. Wilson, political activists
involved in antiwar, civil rights, and other political causes sued
the FBI and Washington, D.C., police for conspiring to deprive
them of their rights to free speech and association.257 Plaintiffs
had a rare smoking gun: internal FBI memoranda explicitly
described the agency’s “Cointelpro” operation as seeking to
“disrupt,” “discredit,” and “otherwise neutralize” the lawful
activities of “New Left” and “Black Nationalist” activists in a
purported attempt to prevent potential civil strife and
255

See Brief for Respondents, supra note 220, at 6a.
United States v. Mayer, 503 F.3d 740, 752 (9th Cir. 2007) (stating that “the
government must not investigate for the purpose of violating First Amendment rights,
and must also have a legitimate law enforcement purpose”); Anderson v. Davila, 125 F.3d
148, 159-60 (3d Cir. 1997) (finding that tactics that ordinarily do not implicate the First
Amendment, such as photographing and surveilling a person in public, violate the law
when undertaken for a wrongful purpose, such as retaliation for a person’s exercise of
First Amendment rights); United States v. Aguilar, 883 F.2d 662, 705 (9th Cir. 1989),
superseded by statute on other grounds, Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359 (1986)
(concluding that the use of informants to infiltrate an organization must not be for “the
purpose of abridging [F]irst [A]mendment freedoms”); Socialist Workers Party v. Att’y
Gen., 642 F. Supp. 1357, 1364, 1416 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (concluding that the FBI’s disruption
of Socialist Workers Party’s lawful political activities violated First Amendment rights of
speech and assembly and awarding damages); Ghandi v. Police Dep’t of City of Detroit,
747 F.2d 338, 349-50 (6th Cir. 1984) (suggesting that informant’s alleged
misrepresentation of labor party’s goals, disruption of political campaign, and theft of
party documents would violate First Amendment); Jabara v. Kelley, 476 F. Supp. 561,
574 (E.D. Mich. 1979), vacated on other grounds sub nom. Jabara v. Webster, 691 F.2d
272 (6th Cir. 1982) (denying summary judgment on First Amendment claims where
factual issues existed as to whether FBI investigation of attorney’s political activities was
in good faith); see also Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, 561 F. Supp. 537,
549, 559 (N.D. Ill. 1982) (approving settlement agreement forbidding investigation or
disruption because of First Amendment conduct).
257
Hobson v. Wilson, 737 F.2d 1, 7 (D.C. Cir. 1984), overruled in part on other
grounds by Leatherman v. Tarrant Cnty. Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit,
507 U.S. 163 (1993).
256
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violence.258 Holding that the alleged interference with plaintiffs’
lawful political activities violated “fundamental and wellestablished constitutional rights,” the court stated that “it is
never permissible to impede or deter lawful civil rights/political
organizations, expression or protest with no other direct
purpose and no other immediate objective than to counter the
influence of the target associations.”259 In so ruling, Hobson
implies that even where the ultimate goal of an investigation is
legitimate (the prevention of violence), the immediate purpose
cannot be the disruption of lawful First Amendment activity.
Cases such as Hobson involved a range of law
enforcement practices, and one might question whether courts
would find interviews undertaken to suppress lawful expression
to be per se impermissible. Decisions involving interviews are
rare. Yet a case involving the Socialist Workers Party treated
interviews no differently from other methods calculated to
disrupt the organization’s lawful political activities, finding
such methods “patently unconstitutional.”260 The court noted
that while interviews to gather information are usually a
legitimate FBI activity, the FBI in that case used interviews of
the organization’s members and their relatives, employers, and
landlords to foment paranoia within the group.261 In Zieper v.
Metzinger, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that FBI
requests to a filmmaker to remove a film from the Internet that
could provoke violence would violate the First Amendment if
they crossed the line from persuasion to coercion.262 The court
held that the First Amendment prohibits such requests where
the “totality of the circumstances” amount to an implied
threat.263 Thus, while courts would likely hold that interviews
undertaken to suppress lawful activities through harassment
violate the First Amendment, in circumstances like Zieper,
courts might consider whether the interviews conveyed an
implied threat to refrain from expression.
While lower courts have generally found that a purpose to
suppress First Amendment rights cannot support an investigation,
courts divide as to whether a showing of a legitimate purpose ends
the inquiry, or whether investigations with a legitimate purpose
may still sweep so broadly that they violate the First Amendment.
258
259
260
261
262
263

Id. at 10.
Id. at 27.
Socialist Workers Party, 642 F. Supp. at 1416-17.
Id. at 1389.
474 F.3d 60, 65-66 (2d Cir. 2007).
Id. at 70-71.
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The lower courts further disagree as to whether they should
employ heightened scrutiny to evaluate an investigation where the
government provides a facially legitimate reason for its conduct—
either to “smoke out” an actual illicit purpose or to invalidate the
overbreadth of the investigation.
Rosenthal, the only commentator to review this split in
authority, concludes that most courts have held that
investigations into First Amendment activities require no more
than a “good faith” law enforcement interest supporting the
investigation.264 That conclusion, however, understates the extent
of conflict even within federal circuit courts of appeals. Thus, the
Ninth Circuit, which had ruled that a government investigation
threatening First Amendment rights need only be justified by a
legitimate law enforcement purpose, modified its decision to state
that that purpose also had to “outweigh[] any harm to First
Amendment interests.”265 In an influential early decision, the D.C.
Circuit declared that only a legitimate purpose was necessary to
subpoena reporters’ phone records.266 In two later decisions,
though, the D.C. Circuit stated that an investigation with a
legitimate purpose might still be unconstitutional, and the court
called for strict scrutiny of investigations that significantly
burdened First Amendment rights.267
Amid the confusion, two broad views appear in the case
law. One set of cases treats the requirement of a legitimate
purpose as the only limitation that the First Amendment
places on law enforcement investigations.268 These decisions
264
265

Rosenthal, supra note 16, at 39-40.
United States v. Mayer, 503 F.3d 740, 753 (9th Cir. 2007), superseding 490

F.3d 1129.
266

Reporters Comm. for Freedom of Press v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 593 F.2d
1030, 1049 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
267
Clark v. Library of Cong., 750 F.2d 89, 94 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Hobson v. Wilson,
737 F.2d 1, 28 (D.C. Cir. 1984), overruled in part on other grounds by Leatherman v.
Tarrant Cnty. Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163 (1993).
268
United States v. Aguilar, 883 F.2d 662, 708-09 (9th Cir. 1989) (refusing to
suppress, on First Amendment grounds, evidence obtained from the INS’s warrantless
use of undercover agents and informants to infiltrate church meetings), superseded by
statute on other grounds, Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359 (1986); Gordon v. Warren
Consol. Bd. of Educ., 706 F.2d 778, 780-81 (6th Cir. 1983) (holding that the placement
of undercover police officer in two high school classes to uncover drug trafficking did
not violate the First Amendment, so long as investigation was not designed to control
content of class discussions); Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 593 F.2d at
1050 (ruling that the government’s good faith issuance of subpoenas to phone
companies for reporters’ phone records did not abridge First Amendment rights despite
incidental burden on news gathering); Jabara v. Kelley, 476 F. Supp. 561, 572-73 (E.D.
Mich. 1979) (holding that good faith surveillance of a political activist would not violate
the First Amendment), vacated on other grounds sub nom. Jabara v. Webster, 691 F.2d
272 (6th Cir. 1982); Anderson v. Sills, 265 A.2d 678, 688 (N.J. 1970) (holding that
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generally do not make explicit how a court would ferret out
such an illegitimate purpose, but the language of these cases
suggests broad deference to the government’s stated
justifications rather than any hint of narrow tailoring.269
Perhaps the strongest statement of this view appears in
several Seventh Circuit opinions that narrowed landmark
consent decrees entered against the FBI and Chicago Police
Department in Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago.270
The defendants in that case acknowledged illegal surveillance
and disruption of civil liberties organizations, religious activists,
and political groups.271 Three years after the district court
approved the consent decree against the FBI, the Seventh
Circuit interpreted the prohibition on investigating First
Amendment activities narrowly to bar investigations only where
there was no “genuine concern for law enforcement.”272 Later
decisions interpreted the consent decree to exclude “negligent”
noncompliance273 and modified the Chicago Police Department’s
order to allow the agency to monitor political extremist groups to
prevent “ideological terrorism,” regardless of whether the police
had reasonable suspicion of any crime.274 The Alliance decisions
make the court’s view clear: the First Amendment itself, not just
a proper reading of the consent decree, prohibited only those
investigations with the purpose of interfering with lawful
expression275 and any more exacting requirement would impede
law enforcement from protecting public safety.276
A second set of cases, however, rejects the view that
under the First Amendment a lawful government purpose is the
courts should not interfere with executive information-gathering in the absence of proof
of bad faith or arbitrariness).
269
One exception is Presbyterian Church v. United States, 752 F. Supp. 1505,
1513-15 (D. Ariz. 1990), which purported to apply strict scrutiny. In any event, that
district court’s use of strict scrutiny does not seem compatible with the Ninth Circuit’s
deferential inquiry in United States v. Mayer, 503 F.3d 740, 748-49 (9th Cir. 2007).
270
Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, 742 F.2d 1007, 1015 (7th
Cir. 1984); Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, 119 F.3d 472, 476 (7th Cir.
1997); Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, 237 F.3d 799, 802 (7th Cir. 2001).
271
Alliance to End Repression, 742 F.2d at 1015.
272
Id. Specifically, the court interpreted the decree to permit investigations of
groups based on their advocacy of violence, even where that advocacy was protected by
the First Amendment.
273
Alliance to End Repression, 119 F.3d at 476 (holding that FBI investigation
into the Committee in Support of the People of El Salvador did not violate the consent
decree even where the FBI acknowledged widespread negligence).
274
Alliance to End Repression, 237 F.3d at 802.
275
See, e.g., Alliance to End Repression, 742 F.2d at 1010, 1015-16; Alliance to
End Repression, 237 F.3d at 800.
276
See, e.g., Alliance to End Repression, 237 F.3d at 802.
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sole test of the validity of a law enforcement investigation and
instead also requires some form of heightened scrutiny to
evaluate law enforcement investigations that burden free
expression.277 Thus, in Clark v. Library of Congress, the D.C.
Circuit required “exacting scrutiny” of an individual’s claim that
an FBI investigation into his political activities had chilled his
expression and prevented him from obtaining further federal
employment.278 The FBI had conducted a wide-ranging loyalty
investigation into the plaintiff, mostly through interviews of his
neighbors, friends, and associates because of allegations that he
belonged to a lawful socialist organization.279 The court ruled that
regardless of whether the government “intended to punish or
coerce the individual . . .[,] [w]here the government’s action
inflicts a palpable injury on the individual because of his lawful
beliefs,” it should demonstrate that it employed the “least
restrictive” alternative.280
While Clark concerned an FBI investigation for
employment purposes, other courts suggest a similar test for
law enforcement investigations directed squarely at uncovering
security threats. Tabbaa itself, while ultimately ruling against
the plaintiffs, applied heightened scrutiny to the plaintiffs’
freedom-of-association claims.281 The court did not conclude its
inquiry in finding a legitimate purpose for the investigation
(identifying individuals who might pose a threat based on CBP
intelligence on the conference), but further analyzed whether
the government’s actions “serve[d] compelling state interests,

277

Clark v. Library of Cong., 750 F.2d 89, 94 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Hobson v.
Wilson, 737 F.2d 1, 27, 27 n.85, 28 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (stating that the “clearly
established” right to freedom of association included the principle that government
action taken for a legitimate purpose would nevertheless be unconstitutional
where it “significantly interfered with protected rights of association, unless the
[g]overnment . . . demonstrate[d] a substantial . . . or compelling . . . interest” that
“could not more narrowly be accommodated” (citations omitted)), overruled in part
on other grounds by Leatherman v. Tarrant Cnty. Narcotics Intelligence &
Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163 (1993); White v. Davis, 533 P.2d 222, 227-28 (Cal.
1975) (requiring strict scrutiny of Los Angeles Police Department’s covert
surveillance of university classrooms, which police justified as intelligencegathering to prevent future criminal activity); Tabbaa v. Chertoff, 509 F.3d 89,
102, 105-06 (2d Cir. 2007). With the exception of United States v. Mayer, 503 F.3d
740, 748-50 (9th Cir. 2007), most courts that express concern for the “overbreadth”
of an investigation, not just its purpose, require some form of heightened scrutiny.
278
750 F.2d at 94.
279
Id. at 91.
280
Id. at 94.
281
509 F.3d at 102.
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unrelated to the suppression of ideas, that [could not] be
achieved through means significantly less restrictive.”282
Notably, Clark and Tabbaa were both cases that
involved claims of more concrete harm—loss of future
employment and reputational injuries or detentions with
intrusive screening measures—in addition to chilling effects
and stigma. These cases suggest that while lower courts are
split as to whether First Amendment profiling requires
heightened scrutiny, plaintiffs demonstrating more objective
harms from interviews are most likely to garner such review.
C.

Addressing Objections to Heightened Scrutiny

Critics of heightened scrutiny for First Amendment
profiling argue that judicially-imposed narrow tailoring
requirements would undermine law enforcement investigations,
which depend on discretion and flexibility to identify and
preempt potential threats. One argument is that the Supreme
Court, out of concern for law enforcement interests, has refused
to create a higher standard for law enforcement investigations
burdening First Amendment activities in other contexts. A
second objection is that heightened scrutiny of First Amendment
282

Id. at 97, 102. Note that while the court applied strict scrutiny, one judge
suggested that a less demanding standard might be appropriate because the
inspections occurred at the border. Id. at 102 n.5. The extent of First Amendment
protections at U.S. borders is unclear. See generally Timothy Zick, Territoriality and
the First Amendment: Free Speech at—and Beyond—Our Borders, 85 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1543 (2010). In United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 623-24 (1977), the
Supreme Court ruled that border searches of incoming international mail did not
violate the First Amendment where existing regulations forbade such searches without
reasonable suspicion and flatly prohibited reading mail without a search warrant. The
Court refused comment on the “constitutional reach of the First Amendment” in the
absence of such protections. Id. at 624. Lower courts have considered First Amendment
claims in recent challenges to warrantless border searches of laptop computers. Two
appeals courts rejected First Amendment arguments in refusing to suppress evidence
of child pornography uncovered through warrantless searches of defendants’ laptop
computers. See United States v. Arnold, 533 F.3d 1003, 1010 (9th Cir. 2008); United
States v. Ickes, 393 F.3d 501, 502-07 (4th Cir. 2005). A district court is now considering
a Fourth and First Amendment challenge to a Department of Homeland Security policy
permitting searches and copying of laptop computers and other electronic devices
without reasonable suspicion. See generally Complaint, Abidor v. Napolitano, No. 1:10cv-04059 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 7, 2010), available at http://www.aclu.org/free-speechtechnology-and-liberty/abidor-v-napolitano-complaint. While the border search doctrine
in Fourth Amendment law rests on the idea that individuals have a lesser expectation
of privacy at the border, these cases do not suggest that individuals at the border have
diminished First Amendment rights not to be singled out on the basis of protected
speech or association. Neither Arnold nor Ickes involved a claim of First Amendment
profiling, but the separate First Amendment claim that searches of laptop computers
require individual suspicion because computers store expressive materials. See Arnold,
533 F.3d at 1006; Ickes, 393 F.3d at 506.
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profiling would place courts in the inappropriate role of secondguessing law enforcement judgments in critical terrorismrelated investigations. A third argument is that law enforcement
agents need clear, consistent rules when making decisions about
whom and how to investigate, and narrow tailoring
requirements would force law enforcement agents to make
complicated “balancing” decisions whenever a First Amendment
interest is implicated.
First, the argument from precedent, which appears both
in lower court decisions rejecting heightened scrutiny as well
as in recent commentary, stems from the fact that the Supreme
Court in several cases has refused to create greater protections
for law enforcement investigative practices that burden First
Amendment rights.283 For instance, the Court has held that the
ordinary Fourth Amendment warrant requirement sufficiently
protects First Amendment interests in the seizure of allegedly
obscene films or the search of a newspaper office, rejecting
arguments that the expressive materials or institutions
involved required the provision of a prior adversary hearing or
a higher showing of necessity.284
Similarly, in Branzburg v. Hayes, the Court ruled that
requiring reporters to testify before grand juries on information
obtained from confidential sources did not abridge the First
Amendment, despite claims that the disclosure of confidential
sources would deter people from speaking freely to reporters and
diminish the press’s ability to gather news.285 The Court concluded
that grand jury subpoenas of reporters required only a good faith
law enforcement interest—creating a standard that Rosenthal
notes is “remarkably like that employed by the courts that have
rejected any form of heightened scrutiny for First Amendment
investigations.”286 The Court deemed the burden on First
283
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U.S. 547, 567-68 (1978) (holding that Fourth Amendment warrant requirement offered
sufficient protection in searches of a newspaper office); Heller v. New York, 413 U.S.
483, 492 (1973) (holding that the seizure of a single allegedly obscene film for
evidentiary purposes did not require a prior adversary hearing); see also Univ. of Penn.
v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182, 201 (1990) (rejecting a university’s First Amendment claim
that subpoenas requesting tenure-related materials should be supported by a higher
standard of necessity).
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Amendment rights “incidental” and found any such interest
outweighed by the public interest in grand juries exercising broad
power to investigate potential criminal conduct.287
Despite the Court’s unwillingness to create a special
standard for searches and seizures of expressive material or
testimony that potentially chills expression, these decisions do
not require a rejection of heightened scrutiny in cases of First
Amendment profiling. These decisions all involved First
Amendment challenges to law enforcement procedures where
other protections against government overreaching already
existed; while affirming the important First Amendment
interests involved,288 the Court found those procedures
sufficient to accommodate First Amendment interests. For
instance, the Court concluded that judges could safeguard First
Amendment concerns in searches of newspaper offices by
assessing the ordinary preconditions for a warrant: probable
cause, specificity regarding the places to be searched or objects
to be seized, and overall reasonableness.289 As Daniel Solove has
argued, the search warrant cases leave open the question as to
how the Court would rule in situations where Fourth
Amendment procedural protections were unavailable.290
At first glance, the explanation that other procedural
protections existed seems less persuasive with respect to
Branzburg, since grand jury investigations do not provide as
much protection: the government does not have to demonstrate
probable cause or satisfy Fourth Amendment standards to
subpoena witnesses.291 Even so, a person still has recourse to a
motion to quash or modify a subpoena where “compliance
would be unreasonable or oppressive.”292 While the standard by
which a court considers such motions is deferential,293 the very
prospect of prior resort to a court provides protection that is
lacking in the case of FBI or CBP interviews. In addition,
despite the wide latitude that grand juries enjoy in
investigating potential crimes, the fact that grand juries are
convened by courts, not law enforcement agents, and that they
287
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necessitate the seating of sixteen to twenty-three jurors, provide
some practical restraints on overreaching that are simply
lacking in FBI and CBP interviews.294 Moreover, the First
Amendment claim in Branzburg differs from claims in potential
challenges to First Amendment profiling: the reporters in
Branzburg alleged a chilling effect on First Amendment activity,
but not that the decision to subpoena them involved any
improper First Amendment considerations. The Court has not
considered whether a different result might be appropriate for
situations involving a greater threat that hostility to the
speakers or speech in question affected the decision of who to
select for questioning.295 Thus, the Court’s unwillingness to
create additional procedural protections in First Amendment
challenges to search warrants and grand jury subpoenas does
not dictate the outcome in other First Amendment profiling
contexts, including FBI and CBP interviews.296
A second objection to heightened scrutiny of First
Amendment profiling is that even if Supreme Court precedent
is distinguishable, courts should not be in a position to secondguess law enforcement judgments in critical terrorism-related
investigations. Especially in the terrorism context, courts and
critics maintain that law enforcement must be permitted wide
discretion to identify and pursue potential threats, and the
294
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prospect of courts inquiring into whether law enforcement
sufficiently tailored investigative methods would unduly “chill”
law enforcement.297
To the extent, however, that this argument rests on the
assumption that courts applying heightened scrutiny to First
Amendment profiling will routinely second-guess law
enforcement decisions, that assumption is unwarranted. Even
courts applying heightened scrutiny have sustained law
enforcement practices where they credited law enforcement
justifications for the necessity of a practice: heightened scrutiny
in this context is not “strict in theory, fatal in fact.”298 Tabbaa, of
course, sided with CBP’s determination that the security
measures employed were necessary.299 Other judicial doctrines
already protect law enforcement officers from second-guessing of
reasonable decisions, including the idea that factual
determinations of the executive branch are entitled to some
deference300 and the qualified immunity defense in damages
cases.301 The risk that heightened scrutiny for First Amendment
profiling will lead to pervasive overturning of executive
determinations is remote. Rather, the alternative rule of
categorical deference to law enforcement justifications presents
the more immediate risk—that even investigations significantly
burdening speech or association, or aimed at the suppression of
expression, will altogether escape First Amendment scrutiny.
A third objection to heightened scrutiny is rooted in
concerns over practical administrability. Specifically, this
concern centers on the idea that law enforcement needs clear,
consistent rules when making decisions about whom and how to
interview, and that narrow tailoring requirements would force
agencies (or even individual agents) to make complicated
balancing calculations whenever a First Amendment interest is
implicated. The Supreme Court itself has pointed to the need for
“readily administrable rules” in law enforcement contexts,
especially where decisions are made on the spot.302 Some courts
and commentators have expressed concern that because the
297
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First Amendment protects such a wide range of expression and
association, heightened scrutiny requirements would force
investigators to assess innumerable circumstances potentially
implicating First Amendment rights.303 Such considerations
might favor a clear rule holding law enforcement to account only
for investigations without a legitimate purpose—and deferential
review of such investigations rather than heightened scrutiny.
Indeed, the distinction between overbreadth and
permissible First Amendment profiling is contextual and factspecific, and therefore often complex.304 Law enforcement
agencies can reduce the uncertainty by adopting more concrete
guidelines to instruct officers on questioning decisions involving
First Amendment concerns; the border officer charged with
interviewing travelers would not be left alone to ruminate, in the
heat of the moment, whether an interview would be “narrowly
tailored,” but to implement practical agency rules devised in
response to constitutional requirements.305 Although such
guidelines would not eliminate line-drawing questions, they
would reduce uncertainty for law enforcement agents. And the
judicial doctrines discussed above, such as the qualified
immunity defense, already protect officers from second-guessing
of reasonable decisions.
More fundamentally, a court’s decision to adopt a
deferential bright-line rule to ensure “administrability” is at
bottom a judgment that the interest in clarity trumps the harm
to individuals potentially subject to abuses.306 It is unsurprising
that decisions favoring clarity for law enforcement officers over
competing liberty concerns often include language discounting
the severity of the civil liberties problem at issue. Thus, the
Laird Court declared full confidence that the political branches
of government would remedy any actual abuses by the
military,307 Branzburg opined that the press was not vulnerable
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to abuse,308 and the Seventh Circuit court that dismantled the
Chicago consent decree proclaimed that “[t]he era in which the
Red Squad flourished is history.”309 Courts less sanguine about
the tendency of law enforcement agencies to respect individual
rights—and more attuned to the real stigmatic costs and chilling
effects on communities subject to First Amendment profiling—
should rather conclude that meaningful judicial review is a
necessary protection against government overreaching.
CONCLUSION
Law enforcement interviews in the terrorism context
involve intrusion and stigma that the existing literature has
not recognized or explored. As overt and highly personal
encounters between individuals in the U.S. Muslim community
and law enforcement, interviews can shape individuals’ and
communities’ very sense of belonging. Where interviews result
from First Amendment profiling, they are especially likely to
stigmatize communities and chill First Amendment–protected
expression and association. Moreover, such interviews carry a
particular risk that improper considerations influenced the
scope of the investigation, even where law enforcement did not
intend to suppress speech. In light of the suppression and
overbreadth concerns in investigations triggered by protected
expression, I have argued that courts should apply heightened
scrutiny to provide some accountability in FBI and CBP
interviews—and that existing First Amendment doctrine
provides a foundation for such review.
First Amendment challenges in this context will not be
easy for plaintiffs. Before a case even gets to court, individuals
must overcome the chilling effects of interviews and submit
themselves to the additional public exposure of a lawsuit. That
chilling effect conundrum—those who are most chilled by an
investigation are least likely to challenge it—will screen out a
great many claims at the very outset. Those who do sue must
establish standing according to the exceptions courts have
carved out after Laird, convince a court to apply heightened
scrutiny, and persuade the court not to defer to law
308
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enforcement justifications on the facts of their case. They must
also overcome additional barriers facing all civil rights
plaintiffs, such as the Court’s new “plausibility” pleading
standard310 and restrictive standing doctrine in claims for
injunctive relief.311
Even under these restrictive conditions, some plaintiffs
challenging First Amendment profiling in interviews may
prevail. Those with the greatest likelihood of succeeding, of
course, are those who can establish significant harm with the
least persuasive government justifications. Plaintiffs who can
demonstrate a combination of stigma and chilling effects plus
some further evidence of tangible harm stand the greatest
chance. In the case of CBP interviews, lengthy detentions and
additional screening measures at the border might suffice to
establish such tangible harm. In the case of FBI interviews,
such harm might include reputational or economic injuries
incurred where law enforcement sought interviews in highly
public contexts; where organizations were the target of
numerous interviews conducted of other individuals; or where
interviewees suffered additional consequences from First
Amendment profiling, such as inclusion on a watch list, along
with interviews.
In addition, courts will be most persuaded by challenges
to interviews where the relationship to actual security threats
is so attenuated as to suggest law enforcement decision-making
tainted by possible hostility or group-based generalizations—
even without a suppression purpose. While the court in Tabbaa
declined to find for plaintiffs, the same court might have ruled
for plaintiffs had the threat information been even weaker—
say, information that suspects might be gathering at Islamic
conferences in general without any evidence pertaining to the
particular conference in question. Similarly, courts might reject
stigmatizing interviews triggered by political letters to the
editor, statements in newspapers, or postings on a Facebook
page, where there is no suggestion of violence.
Although legal challenges to First Amendment profiling
will not be easy, First Amendment freedom of speech and
association doctrine offers potential redress for individuals
subject to onerous interviews where there is strong evidence of
law enforcement overreaching.
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